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INTRODUCTION 
For as long as men have made war upon each other they 
have sought to torm alliances tor peace. To be sure, the 
principles that were enunciated in past centuries Blight not be 
found very sophisticated or cOllplex in this ace of co.plicated 
and changing political syste.s. l Tbose early alliances were 
hardly organiaations, and the peace they strove _tor was to be 
achieved by conquest. 2 Still, all the while men have sOllehow 
retained the notion that recourse to war is not necessarily 
inevitable, nor an inextricable part of lIan's nature. 
Since lien grouped thellselves into nations, and the 
fighting unit expanded froll the singular to the plural, other 
.en have put their lIinds to devising sOlie forll of association 
whicb would abolish physical strength as the determining factor 
in bUlian relations. Physical strengtb in this context is to be 
I For example, the ~pbictyonic Council of Greece, whicb 
was religious in cbaracter, and the political philosopby ot 
Plato, which held that hOllogeneity of stock ought to preclude 
warrare. Republic, Book V, p. 472. 
2John Sylvester He.leben, Plans for World Peace througb 
Six Centuries. (Chicago, 1943), pp. xl-xlI. 
I 
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understood as comprising tbe .achine. .en operate as an exten-
sion ot their own prowess. 
As aen tormed more precise and detinable political unit~ 
more precise plans emerged to bring order to the chaos of a 
~orld ruled by the mighty. Of course, if an individual natioD 
~eret by itself, overwhelmingly powertul and so could establish 
~D etfect one world girdling natioD, the problem would disappear. 
fhere might, to be sure, arise then probl.m. ot civil wars and 
revolutioDS, but tbat is Dot our concern bere. We addr.ss our-
~elves to the question of keeping peace saong natioDs since it 
~s these ot which the world 1. made. 
state.anship bas grown .s complex as tbe world to 
rhicb it attempts to bring order. MOre than ever there is • 
~eed to find causal linea running trom thought to deed and 
rice versa. This is not to satisfy som. logician'. 8ch.ma, but 
~ather to provide an ever clearer and more detailed picture ot 
~he factors which motivate the response ot a particular nation 
~o a given international situation. 
One op6rate& inevitably within the context of one's own 
ociety. The greater part of our thought i. conditioned by a 
hou.and years of orientation to ance.tral behavior. 3 When the 
3Tbi• i. not an attempt to establish tbe philosophy ot 
race rememberance" as an operating principle or even to identity 
be above statement as within tbe same context. It is merely an 
expression of the conservative nature ot man in society. 
3 
tera "Thousand Year Reicb" was cbosen to describe the regime of 
Hitler, it was meant to presage its endurance into tbe future. 
What it pointed to, in reality, was the preceding lIilleniUII 
whicb provided the solI out of which grew tbe Third Reicb. 4 
War, a8 it was studied in lIedieval t1aes, had a derin1te 
place in the lives of peOI)les. Grotlus, the father of inter-
national law, devoted the major portion of his work to deterain-
ing when a war was "just. a5 Until recent tilles war itself was 
never questioned, only the conduct thereof. Twentieth century 
apologists tor war concede that the hUManization of war is all 
right, but insist that war is a part of nature, that it puri-
fies and is necessary.6 "But it is quite anotber matter it tbe 
object is to abolish war entirely and to deny its necessary 
4see: The Politics ot Cultural Despair by Fritz stern. 
Max weber discusses the torce of the "idea" in deteraining the 
behavior of Nations in the political arena in bis book, The 
Tbeory of Social and Econoaie Organization, (New York: nxlord, 1§47J, p. a§9. . 
5Grotius' best known work i81 De jure belli ao pacis, 
written in 1625. 
'General Friedricb von Bernhardi wrote, aWe are acous-
tOIled to recard war as a curse, and refus. to recognize it as 
tbe createst factor in the furtherance of culture and power." 
GeJ'llaDI and the Next WK, (New York: Chas. A. Eroll, 1914) p. 11. 
aeneral Bans von Seeokt was viol~tly opposed to the 
League, to arbitration, or to any form of forswearing war a. 
co.pletely unnatural. 
Schiller wrote "Ode to Peace" tor Beethoven's Nintb 
Syapbony but in "Braut von Messina" be aigO wrote the line: 
"War enables all that is mean." 
I 
.. 
place in historical development."? 
This aspiration (tor peace) is directly an-
tagonistic to the great universal laws whieh 
rule all lite. War is a biological necessity 
of the first i.portance, a regulative ele.ent 
in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed 
with, since without it an unhealthy develop-
ment will tollow, whicb exclude. every ad-
vancement of the race, and therefore all real 8 
civilization. "War is the tather ot all things." 
The sages of antiquity long before Darwin re-
cognized tbis. 9 
Wbat this line ot reasoning tails to comprehend is the 
tact that war, since the advent of .aebines, is no longer 
natural. Thus there cannot be any biological necessity; maD 
will not improve his speed a. a runner nor that ot his progeny 
by driving in fast motorcars. Biologically he haa aChieved 
nothing. To speak of biological development and purification 
through war is completely false for the s8lle reason. It is 
not necessarily the strong and brave who survive a war. Indeed, 
it eould be argued that it is they who are the first to d1e. lO 
'Friedrich von Bernhardt, Germani and the Next War (Ne. York: Charles A. Eron. 1914). p. 1 . 
8See : Claus Wagner's work "Der Krieg als Schaflendes 
W.ltprinzip~" 
98ernhardi, 02. cit. p. 18. 
10MWar spares not the ~rav. but the cowardly.- AnacreoDI 
The Greek Anthology, book 7, epigram 160. Tranalated by J. M. 
Edmonds. 
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It would be better, in arguing this point, to approach it 
categorically, establishing the dichotomy between the Darwtnian 
tbeory and the concept that war (as men wage it) is a necessary 
part of that theory. The degree of technology to wbich weapona 
had advanced would be a nonessential for such consideratioa. 
But for present purpose. it is sufficient to work with tbe 
added light of the twentieth century.ll 
War in the t*entietb century bas shown that there i8 no 
longer any such question to be asked. But it was a nineteentb-
century Germany whicbpreeipitated the Great War. And it was 
tbis same Ge~an1 which petitioned for and gained entry into 
the League of Nations. Great and influential .inds spoke of 
international organizations to~ peace before and 8ince King 
George ot Bobeaia enunciated his grand sCheae.12 But wbat 
were these ideas against schoolbooks wbich, 1t they mentioned 
sucb concepts at alIt placed them in the towers to which tbey 
consigned those who believed in tbe.? Mld wbat were tbey 
IIDarwin cautioned against just such misuse ot his 
theories when he produced his work on the survival of tbe 
fittest. 
12~oog othersl Dant., Grotius. Rousseau, and Kant. 
George of Podebrad, king of Bobe.ia io the filteeoth century, 
outlined a plan of peace wbich was the precursor of all sub-
sequent schemes to avoid war aa the relationship between 
- sovereign entities. The document itself 1s significant in that 
it demonstrates a long history in man's efforts to organize 
for peace. 
6 
acaln.t the overwbelaing. alaost priaordial. dlctua that war i. 
an ennobling experience? That idea bad tw. side. to It. For 
indeed. it was only in war that all tbe aan1y virtue. could be 
exerci •• d and displayed. War brought out tb ••• virtue. in tho.e 
within whoa they would otherwi •• haveno cbance. Stendabl could 
provide anotber route. tbe black ot tbe' clergy, but be wrote of 
an earlier tiae and at a difterent p1ao •• 13 It tbe world were 
Dot inberentlT conservative it would not surviv.. It is there-
tor Dot surprising tbat the principle. upon wIlicb nation. 
operate are reactionary and archaic. The idea of a League ot 
Nation. in tbe context ot Nineteentb-century ~urope was tar 
too radical to find real acceptance on tbe part of polic1llaker •• 
For tbere ia no question but that nations would bave to tor.ake 
a certain dount at what w .. then taken to be include. 10 the 
nation of soveripty.l4 The cODcept of soveript,. drawn. out to 
it. laeviiable and undeniable conclusion. is ultiaate11 iapos-
sible. But nations cling to it and guard against its slighteat 
ero.ion .ore tiercely now than at anyt!.e in the history ot 
Dationstate.. ADy international organization. if it is to be ~0 
13Siendhal·. great novel Le Rouge 8t La Nair" pre.ent. 
the .ilitary and the clergy .s tbe only two po.sible avenue. O~ 
vertical .obil1ty in ••• iety prior to the twentieth century. 
14S• e • Willi .. Leo Lucet. S.J. fti!e International 
Societla Nature agd ortandaatioD ,\forch •• er. Lss.: coII.cet;,f 
the Holy Cro •• Pre... 9 't p_ 14. . 
? 
effective, .ustcommit nations to behavior co.pletely antithetio 
to their past histories. And those histories grip to the very 
soul of the nation. They are a part of the unconseious that 
influences men's actions. IS And states.en are, after all, me. 
subject to tbe same enviroDllental force. as their fellows. 
There can be no otheJ" explanation tor the madness that overco •• s 
an entire state tor brief periods ot history.16 There i8.for 
example, a Prussian mind as distinct from some other group 
oharacteristice of some other people imbued with a difterent 
life'-style - a unique perspective resulting fro. the primordial 
influence ot so.e other specific environment. l ? 
ISs•e , Allred Weber, AKuttuIlesohichtb a18 Kultur-
80ziololie," Leyden, A. W. Sythof ,3S. 
16,. 'if. Foerster, Eu;a,e and the Gem- 9!e.tioJl, (Ne. York: Sbe.d & Ward, I§~ , p. ana. 
l?Foerster, 0e- cit., p. 63-64. 
I I. THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
The League 01 Natioa. is an acbievementquite novel in 
the history of man. But it i. ba.ed upon ideala toward aioll 
,eneration. of •• n bave b.en inexorably moving. The League 
was tbe first eltective move in tbe direction ot or,aniziog 
a world-w!de political and social order, in which the CO"OR 
interests ot humanity eould be .een and served across the 
barriers of national tradition, racial differenee, or geographi-
oal separatioD. 
Betore the League, it waa beld both in theory 
and practice that every state was the sole and 
sovereign judge of its own acts, owing no al-
, legiance to any bigher autbority, entitled to 
resent criticism or even questioning by other 
States. Such conceptions have disappeared for 
ever: it is not doubted, and can never again 
be doubted, that tbe co.-unity of nations bas 
the moral and lefal right to discuss and judge 
the internationa conduct of each of its ••• -
bers. Tbe belief that aggressive war is a cri •• 
against humanity and that it is the interest. 
the rigbt, and the duty of every stat. to Join 
in preventing it, is now everywhere taken for 
grant.d.18 
11; • P. Wal ters. ;pA~B"";;';';'::..aI.--.; ..... -.;p...:~:;.p:;:;;:e;....;:o;.:t.....::.;:N:.;;a_t.:;i.:::;.o.::n:::.s. (LondoD: Oxford Uaivers ty era was ormorlf 
Deputy Secretary-General of 1. P. 1. 
8 
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So uncompromising a statement may be open to an un-
ending barrage of criticism and rebuttal, but it is upon 
such a premise that the League was founded. 19 Implicit in this 
concept that every State bas both tbe right and duty to join 
in keeping the peace among the world community of nations is 
the principle of universality of membersbip in such inter-
national organization as may be established for that purpose. 20 
Along witb this would go a necessary retreat from the position 
held by most states regarding their status of sovereignty.2l 
What then is this sovereignty which must be 
abandoned? It is the absurd claim of a state 
to a right to denounce at any time by its own 
unilateral action any obligation previously 
and willingly assumed. Thi. concept of sov-
ereignty demands that nations live in the 
Jungle where only unrestrained physical power 
is the arbiter of international relations. It 
is the epitome of secularised diplomacy and of 
statecraft divorced from morality. It is the 
philosophy of state absolutism. It contends 
that there can be DO superior to the states no 
moral law to observe, no Obligation to other 
State. to observe, no international law to 
respect, no higher authority to acknowledge. 
It de.ands international chaos wbere might 
IIGrotius Society,"Problem. of the War." See address 
delivered by Lord Parmoor in Gray's lao Hall on April 10th, 
1918, Vol. IV., 1919, p. XVII. 
2°Bolz,"Universality-Aim of 'he United Nations"-
German Foreilft Policl, Vol. It 1965. 
2lWhile it is true, in spite of this strong statement 
regarding the degree of s'over.e~ subscribed to by tbe nations 
of the world, that they also, for the most part, accept the 
principle: pecta sunt .ervanda, the fact remains that tbis 1s 
siaply not enough to provla. the basis tor meaningful relat10n-
ships within an international organization. 
10 
alone r •• ains the only respected retere. 
01 disput... Durin& the past three centuries 
th •• e claims of exaggerated sovereignty have 
been prai.ed and practiced by the modern 
State t an.d the resul t bas been international 
chaos.22 
IB practice, contrary to its e.pou.ed theoreticalf'.und-
atie.s, the Leape did not operate on the basis or univer.ality 
ot ... bership, Dor did it de.and aDJ tUBdemental change IB the 
attitude 01 atat •• toward the concepts 01 sovereignty they ao 
.. jealousl, cherished. 
"" 
Relardins its .ember.hip, tbe League proceeded on tbe 
" ... ption tbat a ne. m_ber bad to be an .... t to tbe organi-
zatioD, not a liability. A ... ber mu.t lacllitate and not 
obstruct the cau.e ot peace and .ecurity.23 Just whicl1 .. 'lions 
.ere in the habit of doln& this was det.rained by delinitio. ot 
the League lounders, and later the League raembera. The original 
... bers ot the League designated tho.e nation. elilible for 
.e.bership wbieb bad oarried the war against Ge,..any. Peace-· 
lovine nations are not tbose whicb retrain tro. eraed conflict., 
but rather tho.e wbieb fight on the right side. wbich aee ... 
• oai otten to be determined by who is the victor. Tbe re.ult 
~2Luce1. 02. cit., p,. 26-27. 
23Radzinski. Alekaander W., "Adaission ot Ne. Membera: 
The United Nationa and the League 01 Nations." (Ne. York, 
Carneiie Endo .. entfor International Peace, 1952). 
Se. also Appendix C tor foraalized Qu •• tiona su~itted 
by League co.-ittee to State applying tor Adaission. 
11 
r •••• bl •• lIore a factional alliance than a world organization.24 
A. the firat a.aeably of the Leagu., th. Argentinian 
d.legation propo •• d an aaendBent r.garding ••• b.rship (in that 
organization) "That all sov.rellD states r.cogni •• d by th. 
co_unity of Datio •• be ad.itt.d to joint the l.equ. ot Nation."" 
in .uch a manner that if th.y do Dot be.om. • •• ber. of th. 
Leagu. this can only be th. re.ult of a voluntary d.cisloD OR 
their part. w2S This propo.al was r.jected a •• carcely co.pat-
ible with the actual condition. of the world. Th. a •••• bly 
yot.d tw.nty-nine to tiv. againat tb ... end.ent. Uruguay·. 
propoaition'.tbat lIe.ber.hip ought to be compulsory for all 
nations, and that there should b. no provision for expulsion. 
let alone withdrawal, MOWlted to little more than th. stat.-
.. at of 8J1 ideal. 
In the cours. of its .xi.tenc., adlli •• ioD to the Leasue 
constituted an act of true political states.anship. In spit. of 
this, at one period or anoth.r, .ver)" recogniz.d state but on. 
w .. a .e.ber of the Leagu. of Nation •• 26 Th. exceptio. was 
§"Ernst Jiickh, and Wolfgang Schwarz, Die Politik 
Deutschlands in V~lk.rbund (Genevel Librairi. Kundl" 1932) p.9. 
25League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of tbe 
First As ••• bly, Me.tings of Co_ittees, Vol. II, p. 224. 
26walters, OR. cit., p. 3. 
12 
ironic and tatal. The United states ot Aaerica was perhaps the 
most significant driving torce in the establishment of tne 
League. Beyond this. abe enjoyed a special position becau.e 01 
her new and ill .. 8nse strength, and her history of non-involve-
.ent in European altaira (her great wealth and lresh approach 
were also sorely needed). Indeed, the remark was aade that 
England and France "gave" the League to Wil.on as a ge.ture 
tor the part played by the United states in the war. 2? The 
picture is that the League was the result .erely ot the gra-
tuitous tultl~ent ot a whim. But the League's anc •• try waa 
ot sounder stock than whiaaey. 
The true ancestora ot the League ot Nations were 
religious pacitisa and international law. 28 Though both tended 
toward tbe same enda tbey .ere be no .eana Identical. Inde._, 
adherents ot one approach very otten excoriated advocate. ot 
tbe other. PaCifists, even to this day, are looked upon with 
suspicion and misgivings. 29 There are aeveral quite under-
standable reaaons tor this. The pacitist, pursued to extre.ity, 
lIuat be considered a traitor. In the 1~1ted underatandinc ot 
lIaR he of tend a nature. For his behavior is so tar beyond that 
J1Ludwig Debio. "Deutschland un d1e Weltpo11tlk 1. 
20 Jahrbundert", (Munich: ft. al3enbourc, 1955). p. lal . 
2Bwalter. Ope c&t •• p. 6. 
29Ib1d., p. 11. 
13 
ot most men that it must be abno~al. It is a ditterence of 
kind, not siap!y of de,r ••• 30 The pacifist is prepared to tor-
sake all, even life, tor the sake ot an ideal. He has coa-
quered tear to such decr.e that th. tundaaental rule of nature, 
s.lf-pre.ervation, is no longer operative. There is nothinc 
.ore awesome or frigbtening than a truly tearless .an. Tbe 
saints were of tbis sort, which is wby they are loved only by 
posterity. Hi. neighbor's cry iSI "Go. be a saint on your own 
ti.e." One is reminded ot the chapter io Doestoyevsky's The 
Brothers Karam"ovl "The Grand Inquis1tor,"31 1n wbieb Christ 
i8 accused of having alienated .an rather than attracted bim 
by the nature ot his eXaMple. If be bad been .erely super-
human, it he bad bebaved as a k1ne of kings or .ightlest of 
tbe mighty. men would have understood. and 1dollzed bi~ tor 
all ti.e. But be waa too subtle. and so de.anded More tban 
... n could giv •• 
Rulers of nationa must deal with great multitude. of 
peopl.. Tbey can not •• brace .s practical policies whicb 
presulle 
an 
J,Gc.rata. .t 
3l8G.: Feodor DOGstoeysky - Tbe Brothers Karam.zov-
A New translation by David Magashack, Vol. 1, Penguin Classics, 
L19 (1958) p. 288. 
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part ot their aubjects. Whetb.r or not they abdicate their 
reapODsibilitiea by a.eking tbe lowest coaaon d.no.inator. th.y 
must act in accord with what tbey conc.iv. to be tbe posaible 
tor any particular ao •• nt iB tla.. ·Politics,· (according to 
one definition) "ia the art of the po.alble.·32 Yb. ach •••• 
for p.ac. prolfe ... e. by pacifists bav. been consldere4 by .o.t 
politiciana to be ai.ply unr.a1iatic.33 On the other haD4, tb. 
rul. of law saoftC natioDS haa b.en consid.red equall, lapracti-
cal. a4 Ind.e4. natioDs bav. b.e •• xc.edingly reluctant to bind 
th •••• lv.a to co.pulaory arbitration in an, but the v.ry sligbt-
est .atters, and .ven then with c.rtaln r •• ervations.33 !bus 
32pi.ld-Yarshal Paul von Hindenburl, .. President 01 tb. 
W.iaar aepublic, was embarraasingly outspoken in this regard. 
33This .as true as .ell Baong tho.e who believed in a 
world order ot peace through law. Cbarles de Vis seber reiter-
at •• tbi. iaa Theorie •• t aealite.sen Droit International 
Public. This position waa taken by .everal speaker. betor. the 
Grotioa Socl.ty. Kanaactiona of tbe Grotius Societlt Vol. II. 
1911; Vol. VII, 19 I Vol. Xt IUS. 
34The aain re.aon tor this, in tbe 81nd. ot those who 
otherwl •• would accept tbe etticacy ot le,al .ettlement, is tbe 
absence ot .anctions, or aore apecificallYt torce. 
35The B&lue conference. in 1899 and 1901 glye aap1e 
evid.nce of the poaitions of the various states in this regard. An, account ot the conterence. will disclose the dearth of pro-
gr.ss in the direction ot compulsory arbitration. ~ong otbers 
.ee, Scbuckings work; The Hagu. Conterenc... It is only fair 
to say, however, that th. conferences were called to d.al with 
dlsaraamentt not the que.tioD ot arbitratioD. 
15 
the advocate~ ot peace througb international law, while in 
much better position than the pacifists, have had little succ ••• 
in convincing governments to keep the peace through juridical 
.eans. Still, they bave enjoy.d creater reapect and .erious 
consideration not le .. t because, on tbe whole, they repres.nt.d 
a .ore distinguished group or individuals. The worldts tore-
•• st legal .inda, its aoat renowned jurists, concerned th .... ly •• 
with international law. Legal .eana for settling di.put •• 
aaong Dation. lormed a lar,e part or the work ot Bugo Grotiu •• 
the rather ot international law. Legal principl •• enjoy gre.t 
•• t •• m Baong all claas.. of p.ople and what is perhaps ev.n 
more i.portant, they are UDd.rstandable. This is not to • ., 
that every layman can dispute with a scholar in the area 01 
jurisprudence, but rather that the law .s a .eans ot social 
control is accepted as in accord with man's nature. It doe. 
Dot orrend any ot bis priaordial urge.. The educated and the 
illiterate, the rich and the poor alike agree to the .ettl .. ent 
ot dirterence. by relereace to judicial coun.el. 36 ot course. 
it may be demonstrated that the poor conceive tbat in it. 
workings. the law militate. again.t thea. What they would 
36In 80ae 80cieti ••• and in soa. classes within certala 
societie., the underpriviledged view the law and it. entorcers 
as 8n •• ies. But in it. broade.t .ense which would include 
Comrade. Courts in the Sovi.t Union, it i. the aost widely 
aocepted formalized .ean. ot .ettling ditterences. 
16 
change is the agents of the law, not the law itselt. But even 
though it may stand otten as an eoe.y, it is Dot an UDDatural 
eo .. y. The law does not insist tbat its advocate. atand apart 
tro. tbe reat ot society. One may question its efficacy but 
not its propriety. There was then rar aore likelihood ot 
progress in this area as a .eans for avoiding ruture wara than 
in coogrea.es ot paciriat •• 
All tbe same, over the years, a great deal ot work waa 
done by paCifists as well as by international lawyers. That 
there waa considerable aceo.plished in this direction is 4e.on-
strated by the fact that the first drart ot the Covenant ot the 
League of Nations was drawn up in tbe cour.e ot several we.ka' 
Intenaive work. 37 This would bave been unthinkable without 
l .. ense prior preparation. 
Walters, in his book on the League. divide. it. pre-
history into three peri04a.38 The first period co.prise. at 
least three .enturies and eovere. the di.solution or the unitie. 
structur. ot .edieval Europe .pitoai.e. by the 801y Ro ... !aptr., 
S'Walters. OPe cit., p. 33. 
38lb1d •• p. 4. 
17 
into dependent national state., down to the Napoleonic wars. 
During that period .everal .che.e. for the preventlon ot war 
between the prince. of Europe were publi.bed by scholar17 
thinkers. AIlGIlI the ••• er. the writing. ot Sul17, EIIeric Cruo., 
Willi .. PenD, Abbe'.e st Pierre, Rouaseau, Bentb ... and Kant. 39 
It is noted that the.. gr.at .en were not pr!aarily known tor 
th.ir peaoe plana. Walter. oalls th •• "literary curiositi ••• • 
" 
The true torce. wbieh would one day 1n the distant tuture !apel 
.en to fora a \)ind1nl leacne were those touched upon a\)ove. 
paoiti •• and international law. The paelfis. reterred to iD 
th1. instance i8 religious paclti ••• 
NOD-reai.tance to violence haa not been the offioial 
doctrine of the Christian Church since the tl.. of Constantia •• 
But many individuals and group. prof •••• d It and .ere pr.par •• 
t. sutf.r anT consequence. for their advocaoy. Th. infl.ence 
of tbe.e pacifi.t. was far greater than th.ir naaber. The 
:II 
Be.lebe.'s book, Plan. tor World P.ace through Six 
Centuri.. cover. all the.e .eh.... in detail. Th.T are ala. 
recounted in the Darby paper pr ••• nte. before th. Groti •• 
Society 1n which be adaoniahe. otber writers on the subject 
for oa1ttlng tb. now higbly regarded plan of George ot Pod.brad, 
KiDS ot Bob •• ia. 
W. EYans Darby, "So •• European League. ot P.ace" 
tranaact&oD. ot Grotiua Societz, IV, 1919, pp. 169-198. 
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Society of Frienda40 particularly baa played a continuingly i.-
portant role inspiring oth.... noneonforaist churches and earning 
resp.ct for their b.lieta. Ot courae, pacifi •• of any sort 
runs counter to interests of governm.nt., for it is a policy 
wbicb would end tte independenee et any state. practising it 
in a world ot multiple nationalistic .tate.. Tbe sentiaent 
r .. ain. attractiYe and p ... rtu1ly 80ving to maay.41 
International 1.w, to tbo.e of a more ratioDal approacb 
to tbe a01ution of probl.... and certainly aore academically 
oriente', does not excite the .... decr.e of passlon or 
devote. advocacy. Thi. doe. not .. aD that tbere have Dot bee. 
a"l t.portaat proponents ot this meana for tbe settleaent 01 
international di.pute.. OD tbe contrary. a great oeal baa 
been written in tbi. area and -eDT eontere.ce. beld. The 
probl.. ia tbat tbe atudeata of international law are better 
aware ot tbe sigaitiaanoe ot certain te..... which de.cribe the 
situation in wbich tb. nations of the world rind th •••• IY ••• 
Th. conc.pt of .0.er.il8ty wbicb tb.y all claia 18 anarchiC, 
in.i.t. that .tate. ..y do whatey.r tbey 11k. so long aa tbey 
are not bound by tr •• ty.42 Tbus war i. out.ide the cognizance 
4o Al.. ImOWll as the Quakers. 
41 Zahn, OPt cit. 
4~cey. Ope cit., p. 14. 
R 
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of international law. Sovereignty, aa was mentioned earlier, is 
an insurmountable obatacle to tbe building ot foundations for 
peace, either witbin the real. of international law, or in the 
pre.ence of ardent pacifi... "Nevertheless, international law 
ia the direct ancestor of the Covenant." 43 In its earlier 
years, a great deal ot ettort was expended by international 
lawyers in deteraining when a war was just or unjust. It was 
generally conceded that war could be both just and lawtul. But 
Grotiu. hi.aelf protested against the notion that a nation 
could go to war whenever it chose. Later teacbers of inter-
national law abandoned, in the face of extre •• sovereilaty, tbe 
distinction between just and uajust wars. still, the continuiag 
develop.ent witbin tbe fi.ld of international law for.ed the 
foundation stonea with which the edifiee of the League waa 
built. .Tbe .orier which would hold tho.e stonea together .... 
a difterent que.tion, one destined to remain unanawered even to 
this day. Whatever _ay b. aade of tbe tracings otthe develop-
.ent of the idea ot keeping the peace among nations. they were 
extremely faint and w.ak. As a practical matter to world 
stat •••• D, they were nonexistent. 
4S ---Walters, OR: cil •• p. 5. 
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The second period described by Walters encompasses the 
interval trom the close of the Napoleonic wars to the First 
World war. 44 Anti-war feeling began to sbow itself in the 
realm of practical politics. The more entrenched torces ot 
nationalism held unremitting sway, but they no longer did so 
without challenge. 45 Governments were torced to consider the 
Irowing voice which demanded they look toward 80me more peace-
tul means to settle disputes. The calculated use ot war as 
an instrument of national policy could no longer be pursued 
aa by Bismarck, however successlul he may have been, without 
regard to public and world opinion. There were tour distinct 
lines of development in the League idea at this tiae. 46 
Increasing internationalism, that is, interdependence in all 
sphere. of activity, and broader and more frequent co.muni-
cation. It was becoming more and more evident that there 
were interests common to all. Consultation and the percep-
tion of mutual interests became almost institutionalized into 
what is termed the "Concert ot Europe.·4? This approach 
4i1bid., p. 6. 
4SBarbara Tucuan, The Proud Tower (New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 4b7-4tia. 
46 Walters, 2R. cit., p. 1. 
47Aa interesting account of this informal, intricate 
arrangement tor coordinating the foreign policies of the Euro-
pean nations was written by Alfred Ziamern. 
The Leafie 01 Nations and the Rule of Law. 1918-1933. (London: lacmll an & Co., T19~9)t pp. 18-16. 
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to the ordering of the world coamunity of nations perdure. to 
this day, and has strongly influenced the torelgn policy foraa-
tion of the s.veral European nations, particularly England and 
Prance, tor generatlona. The third and fourth line. of growth 
througb this period were tbe continuation of the develop.ent of 
international law and pacifi ••• 
Tre.endou. changes In the nineteenth century bad pro-
found and inevitable ettects upon the relations between natioDa. 
Industrialization, aodernization, population growtb, econoale 
growth, incre.s.d trade, growing ape.iallzation, were but a f.w 
ot the tactor. whicb had their i.pact on the conduct ot govera-
.ent. New .eans ot coamonicatloD DOW included the ste ... hlp, 
tbe railway, and the telegraph. They can not be underestimated 
as instruments ot cbange. The tactor of raw materials, natural 
re.oureea, took on new aeaning. It order were not intused into 
the Inere.singly complicated and interdependent aitoation, 
chaos would be inevitable. The solution to some ot the .merg-
ing proble •• was the institution of various speciali ••• inter-
national agenciea.'S Sea. ot the •• had a desree ot control over 
4dpo110wing 1. a li.t of the internatiunal agencies 
(uniODS) whicb were established prior to the outbreak of World 
War I.: 
1868. 
1874. 
1875. 
1883. 
1886. 
Iateraational Teleeraph Union. 
O.iv.real Pestal Ualon. 
International Ottice for Weights and Measure •• 
International Union tor the protection of 
industrial property. 
International Union tor the protection of 
works of literature and art. 
over the national administrations of the countries involved. 
The Universal Postal Union _as the aost co.plete and aueee.stul 
or this genre. Tbere was guod reason for this. It was in tb. 
best interest ot each nation to cooperate with aDd abide by 
the regulations ot the union. Not every Dation tully under-
stood this to begin with, but the vast aajority did. and tho.e 
who did not csa. quickly to appreoiat. tbe need lor and value 
.r cooperation in the tu1leat. The first of tbe.e agencies 
was the Danube Coma!ssioD. established in 1856. atter which 
the nuaber proliterated, though without gaining any political 
int1 •• nce. In the are. 01 operation of tbeae organs, partlci,.~ 
& 
ting nationa did have to 1lalt their own Ire.do. 01 action. but 
this did not a.e. to erode the uncoapromlsinc nature of the 
sovereignty to which tbey subscribed. Atte.pts to subject aore 
politically volatile que.tiona to international control .ere 
8uaaarlly d1 .. 1.se' or thwarted. ae.tricted aa were the.e In-
cipient for.s of international organization. the, constituted 
1881. Pan-lierlean U.lon (ori,. A.erlcan Inter-
national Bureau.) 
1890. Anti-slavery Conlerence at Brussels. 
1890. International UBion for the publicatio. 01 
Costo •• taritfs. 
1890. Central Oftice for the regulation of inter-
national transport. 
1902. SUIar Convention at Brussel. 
1901. International Agricultural Institute. 
1901. International Oftice of Health. 
" 
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DO .ore than symbols ot what pacifists wishe. to iapleaeai on a 
broader and deeper 80ale. There .ere innu.erable otber inter-
national societies tormed outside the field of official govern-
ment activity wbich bore witness to the common nature and 
interests of aankind, but they served not a whit in preventing 
tuture wars. 49 To be 8ure, most ot these international groups 
.ade no attempt whatever to intluence or to beeo •• involved in 
or even to conuaent upon intern.ational diploaaey. The socialist 
International was an exception to this pattern, but wbile it 
disavowed war and arnu.ents~ there was such disagree.ent amonc 
the beterugen.ous meabership it was l~o.sible to secure a 
comprehensive and meaningful formal resolut10n in this regard.~O 
What remained the lIost voweriul force on the inter-
national scene was the amorpbous "Concert of Europe." Althoucb 
Great Britain attempted diligently to make of it a .ore ef-
ficient and reliable instru.ent for maintaining order amonc 
the European nations, ahe was not able to call together the 
nations involved in this group immediately prior to World 
w~ I. Thua. alter •• tabllsbing a Dotable record 01 aohieve-
• 
49There .ere "Leacao. tor Pe .. e" established in 
virtually o.ery eoaatry, including Ger.aD7. 
50 TaebJIan, op_ s11- t p. 456. 
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ments with regard to the settlement ot proble.s among the 
European states, such as the colonial problem in Africa, the 
Concert tailed utterly when it was .ost needed. 
Perhaps the.ost encouraging develop.ents in the tield 
of international order came in the area ot arbitration. 51 
Once a dispute had been put to arbitration, the results were 
usually quite satisfactory both as to the arbitrament, and the 
aanner in wbich it was carried out by the nations involved. 
The real problem 181 In determining wbich dispute. sbould be 
s.ttled by arbitration, who should aot as arbitrator, and 
what tbe basis tor decision should be. Even more difticult 
tban this w.. overco.ing the extre.. reluctance on the part of 
stat.s to bind them •• lves in advance to .u~it .ertain categor-
ie. ot disputes to jUdicial .ettleaent. Tho.e interested 1n 
progre.s along tbis line worked to e.tablish a pe~anent 
international court and to basten the coditication ot inter-
national law. Several nations made re.olution. in tavor of 
the prinCiple of arbitration but these tailed inevitably to 
SlAltbough the Haene conterence. tatled to make 
arbitration coapulaory. and only succe.ded in eliciting the 
wi.b that it be conaidered. Nonethele •• , the number of ca.e. 
put to arbitration rose rapidly, and .tep. were taken in the 
direetion ot e.tabliahinl, it not a per.anent Court, experienced 
pool ot judse. for bearing ea •• s brought tor arbitration. 
Zi •• ern. OR. c!i-, p. 108. 
2S 
'e ratitied. 52 Th. only positive results that accrued fra. the 
Haene Conferences were in this are. ot arbitration of disputes, 
but they were desultory at be.t and 80 proved disappointing to 
all tbo.. who wished to se. peace-keeping apparatus .trengtbened 
Alitation for the abolition of war continued .~ace. 
Societies for peace were fouad.d in seyeral countries 1n the 
fir.t balf of the nineteeatb century. 8y aid-c.ntur,y a .erie • 
• t international congre.... were held. Paoifists were still 
no 80re bighly regarded then tbey .ere previously, but they 
.er. making aore nolse. They .ere even finding .pok •••• n 
.. ong tbe aore radical aeabers of 80.e European parli ... nt.t 
tboulb it 8uat be 8aid that the.. adYocate. u •• d the .ore 
practical arsuaeats of the higb cost8 of araaaent. and the 
wastefulness of war rather tban the condeanatioD of figbtinl 
under ln any circ.stance •• 53 Even so, all proponents ot 
non-violent .ethods tor aalntaining peace were leape. togetber 
as either lapractical idealists or traitors. Given the tact 
of beavily armed state. witb differing interests and contigu ... 
border., it wae unthinkable to foreswear tb. u •• of arms tor 
.elt-protectioD, and unpatriotiC merely to sugge.t sucb a 
S!strau •• -Hape and Possony, International a.l,tio!!, (New York: 1950), p. 822. 
53At the Mannhela Congre •• 1n 1906 a general strike (an 
increasingly popular aeans of protest) was propos.d in the event 
ot war. See I Carl E. Scborske, Gar.an SOtial DeaoeraCI, 190§-
1917, (Boston: Harvard Ualversity Press, 13S), p. 56. 
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possibility. Those who subscribed to such beliet. were sab-
jected to the mo.t excoriating criti.i.m. Aatlpatby to 
pac it i.. was 80 emotionally based as to preclude rational 
evaluation of tbose scbe •• s which were realistically thought 
out and which took into cODsideration all the relevant tactors 
impinging upon a given aituatioa. Tbus even those approacbes 
whicb .ere quite in acoord with "realpolitik" were .purned .. 
ridiculous. Indeed, even atter the Leasue was put into opera-
tion and counted aaGnc ita aeabera the majority ot states up .. 
the earth, tho.e wbo believed too strongly in the etficacy of 
tbat body .a the instrument tor preventing all tuture wars were 
eyed, it not suspiciously, at least with a certain degree ot 
condescension. That aDY internatioraal organiaation could b,. 
~.taell keep the peace aong sovereign nations w ... till con .... 
. . 54 
8.1dered an impractical ideal. 
The tirat opportunity tangible tor the d.-onatratioD ot 
how much progre.s toward institutionalizing .eana tor insuring 
peace had been achieved came with tbe convocation ot the Dague 
Conterenee ot 1899. The invitation and idea tor this contere.oe 
.ea. froa what M.at natioDs considered a higbly unlikel, source, 
Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. All those nations having dlpl •• atl0 
Slebarl •• de Visacher. Ihe.Fi •• et Realities •• Droit 
laternat~onal Publi~, (Paris, 1 5S). p. AI. 
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repre.entative. in St. Petersburg were invited for a two-told 
purpose, to insure peace and to l1ait tbe aras rae.. It ls 
DOW felt that the Tsar's motivation tor the conte renee w.s 
fear of the new d.v.lo~ent. in ar-aaeot ot bis neighbor,inc 
stat.s to the .e.t. Russia did not bave the ao08Y at tbe 
ti •• to devote to k •• pinl up aNa procure.ent.55 Whatever the 
e .. e, diploaatists of the period were skeptical of anT .. aning-
tul results. and did not even want the questioo of 11aitatioD 
of ara_ents brougbt .p, let alone acted upon. Ganaoy particu-
larly was opposed to this question. and ber highest rankine 
.11it~y ottioers and eveo .eabera of tbe ~overDmeot spoke out 
vehe.ently al.inst the Idea. Tke Prussian spirit and infl •• oo. 
aanifested itselt with inoreaslng strenlth and abandon. ~~ 
... not the ooly opposing volee in the ar .... nts question aerely 
ihe strongest and aost uncoaproaistn,.56 The result of all the 
disoussioD relating to this problem were that tbe military 
.. epre.entatives of the aation. involved in rinding solutlona 
leuad instead _ore reason. why it was lapos8ible even to broach 
SS"';'e otrer h;d not been quite aliruisticl Russia bad 
tallen behind in mllitary tecbnolol1 and was temporarily unable 
to finance the r.equipping or her aray. HeDce dis .... ameot 
would bave served her strategic interests best." Strau8.-Hupe 
and I>o.sooy; I.ternation.l Relationlt p. 571. 
S6rrance , because ot her fear or Germany. did not want 
Russia. ber ally at the time. to disa.... Ber opposition to 
disarmament was silent, but etreetive all the .... in collabora-
ting its failure. 
28 
the subj.ct. In the tace ot the great enthusiaam r.gistered by 
.any at the prospect of this gr.at p.ace conference, its utter 
failure as regards the araaaenta question was a bitter disap-
point •• nt. Much ~ore serious work was devoted to the study of 
plans for the settl.~eot of disputes by arbitration or tbe 
aediation of di8iutereste' powers. Detailed projects .ere 
aubaitted by alre.4y oxiating peace orgaJliaations such aa tile 
International Law A.sociation. The fruit ot this labor was 
the drafting of the "Convention tor the Pacific Settle.ent of 
International Di.put ••• • All the invited states .ere sicaator-
ie., and the diploa.tists eonsidered the dGauaent extre.ely 
advanced. It provided for third-part, .ediation "so far a. 
circu •• tance. allow,·and tor the appointment 01 an international 
co..issioo 01 inquiry to aa.eriain the facta of • given aitaa-
tion. 57 But, as .aa indicat.d above, any atte.pt to .ake 
81The ulttaate alreement arrived at by the signatory 
powers at the Bague Conferencea may be .uamaria.d as tollowa, 
1. The silnatory Powers shall use their best efforts 
to ensure the pacific settlement of international 
difticulties. 
2. In case of serious disagreement, diploaacy having 
tailed, the disqreeing Po.ers shall have recourse, 
as tar .a ciroUllstan.e. allow, to tbe ,ood oftic.~ 
or lIediation ot one or .ore friendly Powers. 
3. 1ft such circumstance. an otter of lIe4iat10n b, 
third Powers, strangers to tbe dispute, shall not 
be regarded as UR untriendly act. 
4. In disputes ot 8B international nature. wbicb in-
volve neither national honor nor vital intereata, 
and which arise troN difference ot opinion on point 
ot taot, the signatory Powers shall have recour.e 
to an international C0881.8100 ot 1nquiry. 
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arbitration of dispute. binding in advance on ratifyin, stat •• 
was abortive. Most atates were prepare. to subscribe to bind-
in, arbitration of disputes QO caretully proscribed oategorie •• 
However, uni.portant the categories for arbitration, Germaay 
'.l 
would not acree to lillit her fre.do. ot aotion in the .lighte.' 
de,ree. aeports ot tbe i.roc.edlngs indioate that Germany t. 
unflagging oppo.it10n to any obligation whatever tor arbitra-
tion contributed largely to the tailure of the conference on 
thiB head. 58 All that could tinally be accomplished, and this 
was not to be wholly discounted, was the endorsement ot arbi-
tration as the most desirable metbod tor settling the 10,&1it7 
ot disput •• and interpreting treatle.. A aore positive note 
... established by the creation of the "Penanent Court ot 
Arbitration." While this was nei_her a court, nor permanent. 
It did constitute usable aachinery tor faCilitating the •• -
ployment of arbitration io tbe settlement ot a Duaber ot 
problema over tbe years tollowing. Betore tbe endinl the 
Conference, provision was made for the cODvocation of the next 
Conterence. 
s. In que.tlons or a legal nalure, and •• peclally 
1n the interpret_tie. or applioation of inter-
national cOllvention., arbitration sball be 
recoIDi ••• a. the .oat etfeotive. and at tbe .... 
time the 1I0st equitabl., means ot settling dis-
pute. which dlpl~acy baa tal1ed to adjust. 
58. Scott, Ope c1S., p. vi. 
Eight volatile years later, the Tsar again called to-
gether the nations of the world for the second Peace Conterence 
at tne Hague. With the experience of tbe first Conference to 
draw upon, participants started .ell in advance to determine 
ways to avoid the most vital questions tor whicb they were 
•• eting to tind solutions. Tbe question of ~ .. ent. was to 
be scrupulously avoided. 59 Lovers ot peace who looked with 
sucb hope to this new Conterence would have b.en outraged it 
they knew bow co.pletely the topic was to be avoided. There 
would not even be a chance to tail. The British goverllllent 
was aware ot the intense interest ot a larg. and growing nu.ber 
individuals who d.-anded that 80.ething be done about the a~. 
racet and the larler que.tion ot peace. In a tew yeara the 
voice ot peace was suddealy stronc enouah to be heard. and it 
aot obeyed, at least answered. The representative troM 
Britain w ... s reluctant to .entioD araaRenta and tbeir limit-
ation as any of the delegatea to the Conterence. But the 
loveroment at boa. would bave to answer tor bis tailure to do 
s.. Great Britain was not alone in its concern to avoid men-
tioning ODe ot tbe two avowed purposes tor the Conference in 
the first place. 00ly the Germans were outspoken in their 
denial of tbe .erits of the question. Whe., at last, the 
S9Tbey were to be considered in the next conterence. 
Ibid •• p. 29. 
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British ortered the resolution that the expenditures tor arma-
ments among the nations attendant be •• rious1y examined. it was 
quickly adopted and pursued no further. 60 A great sigb of 
reliet .eelDed to greet this deus ex machina. The question was 
raised and disposed of in sbort and painles. order. That the 
resolutioD .eapt nothing at all did not disturb the partici-
pants in the least; it rather co.forted them and allowed thea 
to get on with tbe mueb more taalliar task of devising rulo. 
to,. war. 
The Germans stood again unalterably opposed to any 
prop •• als with regard to arbitration or the establishment of 
a. Pe ... anent Court. tIl that was achieved was an addendUDl to 
the state.ent ot the Conterence of 1899 which stated the de-
sirability ot tbe use ot arbitration settling dispute. ot 
"ertain kinds. The addendllll reiterated the desirability of 
states baving reeourse to arbitration in so tar as eireu •• tu ••• 
would permit.61 Such a statement only undersoored the tailure 
of tbe Conferenoe to accOllplleb very much in the way of 
aaobinery to a.intain peace aaong nations. Tbo •• states which 
attended the Conference did act a8 an international body, how-
ever to meet again in eight years' time. Unfortunately, the 
lD;alters, op. ~!1 •• p. 14. 
61scott, op. cit., p. 55. Specitically, Article 38 ot 
the Hague Convention of 1907. 
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First World War, wbich they had met to preclude. interveaed. 
It is the tilte tro. the outbreak ot tho war to the 
Conterenee ot Paris that is included in tbe third period or 
prehistory ot the League. The progress aacte dUI" ing the hundred 
years preceding World War I was cObsiderable. Many agencie •• 
both public and private, had been established. Arbitration.aa 
beeo.ing bett.r known, and resort. a to with ,,..ater treq.ency_ 82 . 
Forums tor international discus8ion and partlcipation w.re 
becomlng institutionali.... CustOM waS being created. The 
vi •• is an iapresaive anet taken in isolation. But when wbat 
needed doing 1s .easured against what .u accomplisbed, the 
reaulta are quite difterent. AD increasingly complex and 
divided world seemed to b. moving toward ita own de.truction 
end the aachinery to stop tbe process ot maddeaed disint.poa-
tiOD siaply was not ava11able.63 In that •• n ••• all the hUDdred 
ye..,.s' development was as notbing ca.pared to progre •• in otber 
areas. The.e included the political institutions within the 
nation which its.lt was .hanging in a changing world. Not so 
tile diploaatists either in tbought or .e.de.Th.ir approach to 
8!Zlmaern. OR- cit., p. 108. 
63Tbe only "machiner7" wbicb would concern itselt with 
a problem ot tbis scope was non-institutionali .. d and bad no 
•• ohani •• tor oal11ng togetber its " ... bers," if indeed aueb a 
convocation would bave proved succ ••• tul in the first place. 
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the solution of international ~;roblells had nut kept pace with 
develo!jllents in virtually all other fields of endeavor. The 
unvelievable and total disaster of world War I confronted the 
rulers and the peoJ-llea of the world with the compelling need, 
recognized in conscience, to reconstruct the institutional 
methods for resolving conflicts among naiions. This did not 
happen with the firing of tne first. sbot. Initially there 
was great. patriotic ierver and milituristic spirit. But as 
the war continued and gre. more horrible, touching the life 
of every persoll, the sentiment t1'iat sucll. awful destruction 
should be prevented from ever recurring became the DIode ot 
thought. Great energy then was expended in devisiong plans 
tor peace. Numerous societies for tbis purpose sprang up.64 
But, while there was time to draw ull vlans for peace, most of 
the people, and espeCially their rulers, graslJed only sUiJor-
ficially what they were about. There was not the time for tbis 
new philosophy to seep into the marrow of the bones of its 
adberents. 00 it Nas possible to produce the Covenant of the 
League neatly on l~aper, but not to nurture tbe principles upon 
which it was founded and make them operative. either as regarda 
governments or citizens. An1 public eSl)Ousal of peace organi-
zations was proscribed and punished in Germany, ana her near 
611Hermann Heinrich Grauert, ~r Gescbict.. des Weli~ 
triedens. des Volkerrects und der Ideee eJ.ner Lig. der J!anOIl!tD. 
(Munich, 1920). ~ /~.~\S TOw~ 
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neighbors remained silent out of tear. But even the goverDDlent 
1n Great Britain spoke of the desirability of such an organiza-
tion, and gave encouragement to the private League societle •• 65 
The most favorable climate tor the growth and proliferation ot 
sucb groups was in the United states where tormer president 
Talt founded tb. "League to Enforce Peace.,,66 Botb political 
parties in the United states endorsed the League idea, but 
Democratie president Woodrow \filson, through his higb olfiee 
and powerful advocacy, assumed the position of world spoke .... 
for the ial.leaentatioD of tbis new international order. Tbe 
position of the United States was quite fayorable for the role 
of chiel advocate ot the League. Aaerica had no bistory of 
entangleaent in European affairs and ao was largely free t.roaA 
the suspicion tbat inevitablr aet the proponent ot anr scbeme 
that bad to do witb the ordering of relations bet.een the 
nations of Europe. Furthermore, she had great .ealth and 
power, extre.elr important attributes tor demanding respect 
among sovereign ~tates. 
The longer the war lasted, the more disposed were the 
people, the armies, and their leaders, to wish tor a peace 
which was _ore than a cessation in fighting. The governa.nts 
ot the United State. and Great Britain assured the people that 
RSL;rd Paraoor address at Grotius Societr. "The League 
of Nations", Itan,actions of th, Qrotiu. Societ,. IV, 1919, p.XX. 
66 Walters, op, ci~ •• p. 18. 
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wbat they were fighting for was a ne. international order which 
would diminish the possibilities of tuture warSt and lessen the 
burden of armaaents. The League, per se, had become one of the 
war aims. 
In the cour.e of the war. a multitude of plans .ere 
drawn up ranginl trom tbe merest outline to the most elaborate 
and detailed plans for a world federation compriaiol and inter-
national parliaaent.6t 
III. THE QUESTION OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP 
IN TliE LEAGUE 
We muat then exaain. ihos. faciors which finally 
aotivated the rul.rs of G.rmany to bring that nation into the 
League. Two things were tnvol ve.: tb. decision that sucb a 
step sbould be taken, and .aneuv.rinc whicb .ffected the trans-
action. The first ia spe.ulationl the •• cond. bi.tory. 
Guatav. Str....... 1. ,.n.rally conaidered to b. tb. 
68 arcbit.ct of Geraaay'. entrance into tb. Leacu. of Nations. 
The political bistory t. which b. was witne.s and principal 
actor was chaotic in the .xtr.... Not a voice baa b •• n rais.d 
Dor a word writt.D wbich 18in.&7. bi. abiliti •• as politician 
and stat...... Be7~Dd tbis. every 1laDD8r of encoal_ haa be.n 
h.ap.d upo. ht. by his many biograpb.rs and co .. antators. Ther. 
i •• nonethel.s •• one at ray voic. of opprobria..69 which sbould, 
at 1 ... t. give us pau.e in our appreciation of bla as a .an, 
and 1D our e •• lnaiioa of bia work. Geraaay' •• a.bersbip ia tbe 
I e'Erieb EI'Ok,O •• Chictte der Wei •• rer ReeubliS_ (Zurich. Vol. It 1956. '01.1. 11", '01. IX. p. 4g. 
69Uana W. Gatzke, 8{1;-aJUl asd the hera.ent of §!r-
• ..,. (Jobna Hopkins Pre •• , i,. 'p. !. 
See also Godfr.y Scb.elet The Wei.ar a.public, (LondoD. 194.). p. aaa. 
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League was anticipate. Iroa tbe be,inniDg.70 Indeed. auell .t 
the thought which provide. the background tor the League idea 
derive. fra. German Citizens, particularly tts jurists.?l There 
were Leagues tor pea.e organized in Ge~any aa .ell as in other 
countries ot the world, and Germany'. participation in the 
Hague Conference. and the Paris Confer •• ce bears te.tiaony to 
the exlstenoe of the Idea. BeyoDd this. any organisation whioh 
intended to be aore than aD allianc., or at least pretended to 
be fIOre, >; could not possibly exclude the geographical heart of 
Europe. The Coacert ot Europe would bave b.en o acophonoua, 
indeed it Geraany were not one of tbe playera. 
Bu.t the Leacue a8 an ideal and the League in reali tf 
were quite different matters. Bowever .ucb discussion .igbt 
devolve about an international or eve. supranational organi-
zation, no statesman conceived of it beyond tbe abstract. 'or 
one tbing, f •• people, outside some of the rulers of Germany. 
believed tbere was about to be a great war or at least war, 
was i.-inent and at that aoaent inevitable. The Germans aoved 
- '°Betore the war was ended and the Treaty.t V .... saille. 
drawn up, tho •• nations occupied in developing plaas for a 
League of Nations worked on tb. a.sumption that Germany would 
hold .e.bership by virtue of ber position aIIong W •• tern nations. 
France and England both held tbi. at~itude. 
?IVeit Valentin, a;8Ch1Ch$' cit! 1Ik.rbunde,edanke- in 
Deut8cblag4. (Serli8: u.. &,11.... 03. } 
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inexorably in that direction, but they .ere alone in so delng.72 
That i8 not to say that other nations did not contribute to 
the altiaate outbreak ot hostilities, but only to indioat. 
that in no other country were there leaders oriented in tbe 
way the German ailitarlsts .er •• 73 Perbaps every nation bas 
It. b-.ks. its glorifies ot war, 1t. frustrated heroe., but 
rarely are tbere to be found responsible aen ot high pOSitions 
who expre.. theaa.lve. 88 did many ot the more highly plaoed 
.ilitary mId civilian Geraan leadors.74 Tkus the .. n who 
guided a.naJq's de.til'l7 wera 1a DO way ready to oonsilo their 
task to an .. s.blaga ot other Dation.. War was neither u-
natural DOl" tamora!. It might o~.n be the highest go04. What 
... unaatural was tor a soveraign nation to give into other 
bands decisions as to when, where. and it it sbould tight. 
Again the question. bow did Germany find its way into 
the League? 
The culture that was developing 10 Ger..ny around the 
cloae of the ainete.nth century &l\d wbicb .... tur.d .. enra-
" 
728ernhardi-Foerster both agre. on this point. 
Bernhardi, OR. elt., p. 11. 
Foerater, Ope clt., p,. 4-7. 
73Foerster 1. partioularly lns1ste~t on this point and 
concernod le.t it be torgotten or .1ni.i.ed. 0,. ciS •• p. 4. 
7480 outspokenly aggressive were 80a. of the German 
leadera such as Bind.aburg and vonSe •• kt that they did 80cb 
da..ge to the diplomatic positlon of tbeir foreign .1niater. 
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ordinarily rapidly in the beginning ot the twentieth century 
gave rise to a .egalomania which pervaded the entire nation. 
the aystical notion ot "Yolk."7S This was more than nationali •• 
it went beyond pure raoi.a, although these two eleaents were 
boldly .anit •• t. It was a beli.t in eoae vaguely defined 
4estill7' I Gentall1 was to be the leading nation of Europe, and 
as such, of all mankind.?6 This posiiion was bers as of right. 
The GeJ"llaa people were in. every way superior. It is aIIazinc 
how tolerant one can be of anotberts opinioD, bowever extre.e, 
If it bappens to be particularly flattering. Of course, there 
.ere othe.. powerful currents ruaning ihrougb Geraan society at 
tbe .... ti .. , allot wbich hadtbeir effect on shaping the 
nature and direction ot her history.7? 
'!Pri ts Ste.... foil tie8 of 811 t.tal ~se!1tt Douhle-dar ARchor Book t (New Yori. a:araen£y. IllS,. 
76w• Evans Darby. in 8 paper rea4 betore tbe Grotlus 
SOCiety 08 Nov •• ber 28, 1916, recounted an interview con-
ducted by an Aaerican journalist, Mr., Swope, in which a wide11 
known German protessor, SteAgel, was askedl "whetber he be-
lieved tbe Empire (Ge",,,,) would participate in tuture 
international conference. 8$ tne Hague." R. gave "no" as his 
answer, and said "that such Conference. would be unnecessary 
under a Geraan peace " which be aelined as a sort of su,er-
state, in wbich the 4.r.afta would enforce order in tbe World. 
"That one condition of prosperous existence, especially tor 
the neutrals," be aaid,· i. suhal.sion to our supr ... direc-
tion. Under our overlord.hip all international law would 
become a.perrluous, tor we, of ourselves, would instinctively 
give to each one his rights." 
Grotia. SOCiety TrfD!aotioDI, Vol. II. 1917, p. 146. 
778888 IColm. The Miad. of GeNU,. The Education ot • 
Nation, (New Yorlu Harper'; Io'w, 1080' pp. S:§1 and 212-308. 
The shocking provisions or the Versal11.. Treaty pro-
voked a defensive reaction on the iJart or Germans which 
militated against their ever learning anything about what sort 
of philosopby poase.sed their soul.. It also put tbea in a 
hu.l1lating position in relation to other nations. They coo-
ceive-u th~mselves to be one of the great powers (it not the 
greatf:st). It was intolerable that tbey should be watched by 
tealla or foreien inspeetors to e.sure against their recovering 
themselves. It was beyond bearing that foreign troops sbould 
be occupying tbeir sovereign territory, and that they could 
Dot fortify their own frontiers. A Ir.at llower at the lIerey 
of every neighbor was unthinkable. Yet the situation persisted. 
All tbe other great Euro.pean nations duly beld their places on 
the Council of the Leaaa. of Nations. It was the tbing, tbe 
place to be at the moaent. The world took tbe League quit. 
seriously tor the most part. Not so the international politi-
. cians. 78 But It was not good to... to express Olle .'.is c7llicism ill 
public, nor was it particularly prudent. There might even bave 
b •• n a glimme.. of beli.t In thia new metbod of conducting in-
ternational relations. Perbaps there was even a gliamer of 
bOp., but it was faint. No couatry was aore .keptical than 
Germany. But ... bership in the League was desirable fro. many 
other points of vie. than that it was a means of keeping the 
peace. 
18 Waltera, Ope 01$., p. 28. 
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It is ironieal that membership in tbe League eould 
provide Germany with the opportunity to reconstruct herselt 
as a formidable military pewer.19 She could argue that •• --
bership was impossible so long as she could not fulfill one 
obl1catlon ot •• mbership; auely, the article calling for the 
collective us. of ar.. and men against any peace-breaking 
n&t10n. 80 She could not pledge what ahe did not bave. Wore 
1auBedlately important t -the substitution of a League te. to 
inspect the state of Geraany's compliance with the terms ot 
ber disana_ent etmabled Gerllany to rid herself ot tb.e painful 
scrutiny of tIle previously ubiquitous Allied inspection teams. 
An additional proviso gave Germany the right to deterMine the 
particulars as to ti.. and place ot the League inspection. 
Still turther, Germany could more strenuously demand the de-
occupation of the Rhine by Frencb troop$. A.part fl"oll any 
'§Gat&ke. in a bibliOgraPbicai Dote, explains the 
paucity of written references to Gorman rearmWlent by -civilian 
and lIili tary Geraan lead.era. "There was tbe constant tear on 
the part ot eV$ryone involved, that news ot the Reich.webr t • 
secret operations aisht leak out. ADd.s Severing once put 
1t:""lf one write. it doWD., it is as good as betrayed. ltt 
~ .. esella.nn and the «earm_eat of GeI"lUUlI. Saltillo ... , 1954, p.120 
e Increase In armaments can Se Illustrated by the rising de-· 
tense bUeltet. Military expend.iture. went troa 476 mil110D 
.arks in 925 to 504 IIl1110n in 1925, and 553 million in 1927. 
And tbis was not the entire aaount, tor clandestine military 
payments totaled between 5.5 and 6 millioD marks. 
Eyck, oe. oit., pp. 143-149. 
80Artiole 16, Covenant or the League ot Nations. a •• 
Appendix. 
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interest whatever in the ideals of the League, it was all to 
Germany's advantage to become a member of that international 
organization. On the part of existing members of such an 
organization. there usually is the feeling that an ever ready 
conference table is a vitally important thing. and that a 
continuing dialo~le will forestall resort to arms. To ttchiev. 
this, the members of the organization are quite willing to 
admit to membership states which othe~viRe do not fulfill the 
stated requirements. Since it would not be considered "fair 
play" to behave with suspicion toward a sovereign equal, it is 
aore difficult to keep a member nation under surveillance than 
a non-member. Schemes for disaraaaent generally tail because 
ot the extreme reluctance of nations to allow any aeaningful 
form of on-site inspection. The only euccessful venture in 
thia area was feasible by its peculiar natu.re and lill! ted 
scope. Major ships are not eas1ly hidden. either in the con-
struction state or afloat. It is not very difficult to 
measure the tonnage of a natioD'£ warsbips. particularly when 
all harbors are open to coamerc1al traff1c. Whether or not a 
shipyard can potent1ally construct a battleship, it cannot clo 
so in 80 •• secret sbed. Nor can it be accomplished in a week. 
Long before it beco ••• a tact. the fact of its building is 
obvious to all. 
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Two approaches to avoiding war in the settling ot inter-
national disputes have generally been taken: arbitration and 
discussion. This, of course, excludes the device of collective 
security wbich is tinally the metbod ot peacekeeping "resorted 
to" by the League and the United Nations. Collective repul-
sion ot aggression is obviously resort to arms, hardly a 
peaceful settlement ot a dispute. ThiS, of course, is the laat 
resort atter the above named appro ache. bave tailed to pro-
vide a solution. ot the two, the latte~ discussion, Is anch 
preferred by most nations. ArbitratioD, unfortunately, re-
quire. at one point or another that a nation pro.is8 to abide 
by the finding of some extraneous power. There i. no recour.e-
it i. the surrender of som. degree of SOVereignty. This is 
intolerable. When one loe. beyond this to the question ot 
coapulsory arbitration wherein a nation bind. it.elt in advanoe 
to the resolution of certain disputes by a third-party judge-
ment, the impinge.ent upon sovereignty is si.ply unthinkable. 
There remains, ot cours., the ongoing dialogue, the per.anent 
conterence table. It is inconceivable that nations can per-
siat in their aystical beliet in the etficacy ot this medium 
. tor ke.ping peaoe when history records 80 8801 instances where 
this provided a convenient diYersioD for use by stat •• bent 
upon disturbing deeds. There are instances which .ay be dra .. 
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troa any epocb,81 but never More than recent ti •• s botb in and 
out ot the League and United Nations. These range frOM tbe 
episode or the Trojan Horse to that of the e.i8.arie. fro. 
Japan on tbe 7th ot Dece.ber 1941. The old diploMatists in-
sisted that such a body .s the League A •••• bly, and eve. tbe 
Council. would bave the tendency to de.troy all po.sibility or 
.eaningful dia10cue aad result ratber in a pre8tigious plat-
tora tor de.asogues. It baa not prov.n all tbat bad, Bor. e. 
tbe contrary, baa .uch been aoco~li.hed on the level ot 
.tat ••• ansbi,_ Th. bope perdure., all the saae, that as lOBI 
as words tlow, blood will aot. 
So it was that Geraany had eyery reason to pursue 
... bersbip in tbe League quite apart fro. any belief in the 
League'. idea or principles. This she did under the guidanc. 
ot Dr. str •••• ann. This is not to say that tbe DatioD in it. 
beteroceneity ot political parties at the ti •• was of one 
aind 1n this regard.82 Tbe account of the maneuvering that 
went on within Geraany on the one band. and within the League 
on the otber. 1s ab.orbing to say tbe lea.t. Tbat story shall 
be reiterated but first ther. i8 another tactor regarding 
Germany'. de.ire to enter the League whicb Bust b. disclos.d. 
IICountries still see. to be able to talk and sboot at 
tb. s ... ti ••• 
8~.ary Asbby Turner! Jr., str •••• ann and the Politics 
01 tbe We1aar R. ubllc. (Pr1Dcetoa: PrIne.toa UnIversIty Press, 
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Germany felt herselt inordinately huailiated by tbe Treaty or 
Versailles in which was incorporated the Covenant of the League. 
She had suttered iameasurably as a result ot tbe war. Condi-
tions atter the war .ere even wor.e, if tor no other reason 
than that there was DO longer the compelling distraction ot 
the great conflict itself. Now she was being watched like a 
naugbty child. Not being a aember of tbe League. she was ex-
cluded froa tbe councils of the "greaf powers. It is not easy 
tor a nation ot people to accept guilt, either as individuals 
or aa a country, tor a contlict involving 80 great a part of 
the world 80 deeply. In the end, tbe citizen aust aake an 
act or faitb in bis leaders or else be can DO longer retain 
bis citizensbip with it. attendant duti.a. ODe may disagree 
on policy, but there aust remain an unfailing trust in those 
who guide tbe country, Dot so Much that they a~e tollowing the 
wisest policy, but that they truly represent the interest of 
the nation. It is possible then to condeaD tbea tor tool ish 
actions, but never for treachery. If tbat is so, then there 
CaD be no que.tion of guilt. A DatioR doe. not take up arms 
at the behest ot traitors. An inordinate aaount of energy was 
expende. in propagandising tbe "CUilt-lie.n83 It was probably 
aDDeoessary tor the .oat part. It indeed Geraany was at fault, 
bow could she hera.lf ha.. had to endure such pai.? In the 
83Ericb Eyck,op. cit •• p. 96. 
courae ot their suffering, the German people expiated their 
sina. When, after the wart the bardships and sorrows con-
tinued, it was siaply too aucb to insist that they merited 
even aore privatioDs and must at the same time acknowledge the 
justn •• s ot it all. 
The school books of a nation understandably lay sreat-
.st eaphasia upon those events in the world which arfect that 
nation's bistory. Nations, even as individuals, are egocentric. 
It is one ot the factors which make for survival and there Is 
notbing more basic than preservation of selt. In tbe aodern 
epoch tbose states bave known greatness which have cultivated 
a broader vie. ot the world, wbicb bave developed a sen.e ot 
proportion. That is not to say, however, that in so doing 
they bave oeased to look upon the world other than with th..-
•• lve. as its center, but rather that the significance ot other 
torces was recogni.ed. The Germans presuaed a place 880n& the 
ereat nations ot the world. Their history books placed the. 
there. They could not lone tolerate a le.ser role. Spain was 
once such a power. In lour centurie., she bas not learned t. 
accept being thougbt ot or treated a8 1 •••• 84 Sbe has of courae 
14Waltera give. a very .oving account ot SpaiD'. with-
drawal fro. the League tor the reason that she could not give 
over her place on the Council to Geraaay and still re.ain with-
in the organicatioD. His aooount is s.naitive perbaps be.ause 
he was a part of the working of the League as its Deputy-
se.retary. op •• it., pp. 388-389. 
adjusted bel" everyday activities to accord with tbe facts. But 
bel" spirit cannot acknowledge it. In the case of GeraaQ1, tbe 
tacts indicated that she belonged Baoag the great powers. Her 
cross was that the otber great powers for tbe aomeot refuse. 
to allow her ber rightful place.8S They atte.pted, .s it were, 
to keep her dowo 10 spirit .s .ell as body. This would oot do 
at a ti.e wben that couotry was already so distressed io spirit. 
For this reason alone GeraanT aust enter the League. It tb. 
League. as instituted, bad been identical with the more ad-
vanced concept of what it ought to have beeo. Geraany aever 
would have b.en adaltted. Not that m •• bership was to be so 
exclusive; on the contrary. it was to be universal in principal. 
Betore it was officially written out of exi.tence, every recog-
nized nation but one was included .. one its membership.S6 
Since the League foraed a part of the Versailles Treaty, ..... 
bership in that organisation nece •• arily iapli.d coapliance 
with the Treaty.8? GeraanT nev.r coapletely tultilled the 
IIGreat.st opposition to Ger.an ae.berehip in the 
League cam. froa France, although, at the very outs.t of ita 
fOUDding, Franee indicated, at least off101al1y, that ab. was 
aaenible to German inclusion as an original aember. 
86 Walters, 02- cil-. p. 3. 
87This fact was greatly deplored by .any co .. entators 
on tb. Leacue. Se.the paper by Sir Grab_ Bower. Grotiua 
Society Proceedings, Vol. VII, 1922. p. 93. On the etber 
band. it has been argued that if the League had not b •• n mad. 
a part of the Versaille. Tr.aty, it would never have co •• into 
existence. 
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obligations laid down by the Treaty. She did not, at first. 
siaply ignore the aore burdenseae or odious provisions, though 
at one period, it seemed as it hostilities would have to be 
renewed in order to force her coap1iance.88 It was precise1T 
the tact that tbe only eftective aeans ot coereion that could 
be levelled at Geraany was armed toree that led the weary 
world to condone Geraant,'s tailure of coap1ianee to the letter. 
,towever convincing the excuses sbe gave tor her behavior, it 
pursued they would hav. proven inadequate. No one wanted to 
engage in pursuit. It was tar easier tor the aoment to accept 
tbe excuse. tendered. It is ever thus: government and busi-
ne •• are not in the bands ot visionaries. The visionaries are 
present to provide the ideological apologies but not to deter-
aine daily operating policy. The operations are always at a 
tactical nature, and being 80 liaited, tolerate elements that 
in the very long analysis .a1 contain the seeds ot d •• truction. 
Appeasement is as natural to .an as walking upright. The 
greater part ot our lives is spent trying to avoid the inevit-
able. Neither.an nor nations bave learned to deter pleasure. 
One does not bear of dictate. ·live year plans· in tree 
. lAih.n the bead ot the Geraan deleeation to Versailles, 
Count Ulrich eon Brockdortt-RaAtaau. then toreign .inistr., 
returned to tace 111. lover_ent with the shooking terms of the 
treaty. they absolutely retuse4 to ratily it. The alternative, 
ot course, would have been to renew the fighting until it was 
accepted. a horrifying prospect to either side. 
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societies. It 1s only the torcing of policy to conto~ with 
ideology that makes for its employment within totalitarian 
regimes. And even here every compromise is made. In de.ocra-
tic nations of broad suttrage, those in power IIUSt "deliver the 
goods" or expect to be voted out ot otfice. Even for the high-
est of caus.s the peopl., generally, have a very 11m1ted 
patience. It is not all the fault of the electorate, however. 
'lbe leaders are also oreatures of the sam. environment which 
demands immediate satisfactions. Sacrifice in the present tor 
the sake of future gains is for the te. highly motivated indi-
viduals who oan struggle for abstract goals which they are 
wholly unsure of aohieving. The rule ot behavior i8 to t .. -
porize: perhaps things will be set aright and then sacrifice 
will bave been unnecessary_ It not, tben tbe evils wbich may 
come will be met when they are clear and present. Irbe old 
adage of ". stitcb in tilDe" is not convincing enough. It is 
astounding that so many were so surprised when Hitler actually 
did wbat he threatened to do in Meln Kame. How Nazi Germany 
became a reality is a lascinating study which in itselt tells 
that story of man.89 It is relative here insofar as it illus-
trates how unrepentant aDd unregenerated Germany was after her 
deteat in the Great War. gO She Dever was ready to accept the 
" 89Fritz Stern·. study. "The Politics of Cultural De.-
pair", is devcted to tracing o.e aspect of this que.tioo. 
90 ... W. Foerster: MOP! ~ the Get!8Il 9!!e.tio!". (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1 " p. 72. 
wague idea and every thin,; sbe did proved it. What waases is 
that sbe was 80 carele •• in aot hiding her teelings. She did 
Dot approAch her conquerors with humility or any sign ot con-
trition. When she indicated bel' own ineligibility for reasons 
ot bel' not being able to assu.. her sbare of those obligations 
of the League which required the co .. itaent ot arms tor col-
lective derense, sbe did so only to ~pen the way to bel' own 
rear.aIlent. Vt'hether or aot she could 11"e up to the Covenant 
WaB a. question quite simply never asked. Germany could be 
quite cavalier about this since she knew well that tbere could 
never be a true League of Natioos without bel'. That tbought, 
ot eours., did not disturb bel' one wbit. Without Germanyt • 
••• bersbip, the League would be oe; Ilore than an alliance against 
German,_ Obviously, it was all to the good of Germany to be-
co •• a m.aber. She ••• t of necessity be treated as an equal 
and then the .ost galling aspect of the League, that it was 
an alliance of victors, would be done away with. There could 
be virtually no negative aspects fro. the German standpoint aa 
tar as non-Gentans were concerned. But this was not to reckon 
with the actual situation 1n Germany. the state of the German 
.ind. Much work has been done to determlne just wbat the 
German mentality was since it haa given rise to the greatest dis 
turbanee of tbe entire first half of the twentieth century.91 
11 
!atioD 
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It is untortunate that the attention .pan ot adult •• even aa ot 
children, is so limited. Thus a question that was never 
adequately an.wered is laid to rest when an answer would be 
moat instructive to all .ankind. But we concentrate upon 
those things which i_ediately iIIpinge upon our lives and will 
not grant the time and economic resource to what is termed idle 
speculation. It ••••• , .ven as the world growa richer and 
better able to support ivory towers t that less is spent, both 
proportionately and actually, in 80 doing. The German que.tion 
which perdured through a second World War More terrible than 
the Great War which gave birth to the League ot Nations. waa 
solved tor the .. ment by an accident and little more attention 
1s given to It. 92 
Th. Ger-an need to be recognized by the nations ot the 
world as one ot the great powers, and the will to rear., .ere 
. two ot the strongest forces in deter-ing her toreign policy.93 
• 92The allusion here is to the tact that Germany was 
divided iato Eaat and We.t Germany as a result ot the manner 
in which she was conquered and occupied in World iiar II. The 
exact boundarie., according to Cornellu. RJaB's book, "Tbe 
Last Battle,· were tile result partly of the mislaying ot the 
plan that P,re.ident Roo.evelt endor.8d tor capturing Berlin, 
and the deplo)~ent of the British and American armies in 
England prior to the landing on the continent. Divided as she 
iSl sbe does not pose the threat to world peace that she did PI' or to the First and Second WO"ld ,tar. 
93LVdwig Zimmermann. ~ut.Cb! Au ••• neolitik in de, 
lra dar wei.ver Reeub1ik. (01 tingen: Ulis'teraciUliClt-Ver ac, 
I9S8), p. 75. 
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As far as the German leaders were concerned, joining tbe League 
would facilitate those ends and grant permission by detault 
to rearm. When, a very tew years later, it became uncomfort-
able to continue on ber course because of disapprobation with-
in the League, sbe quickly witbdrew. 94 She had, in the .ean-
time, built up ber strengtb so that sbe could leave with 
impunity. 
One of the reasons tbat it was so difficult for Germany 
to enter tbe League was that sbe was unable to explain her 
true reasons for joining to tbe various domestic tactions who 
were opposed. Had she done so, sbe migbt have built a con-
sensus at home, but the League would then surely not have 
invited her membership.as It was Dr. stresemann who managed, 
througb incredibly adroit .an.uvering, to torge aggrement out 
of severely antipathetic tactions. The parties on the right 
.ere inexorably opposed to the Versailles Treaty and anything 
connected with it. 96 They resented most strongly the "guilt 
clause," the reparations, and the tact that tbe League it-
.elt bad been made a part ot tbe Treaty_ It was 
§4GermaDy announced her withdrawal trom the League on 
October 23, 1933, considerably le.s than a decade after sbe 
entered. 
951t is seldom possible, for diplomatic reasons, to 
explain tully the reasons tor torelgn policy moves. Even it 
they could be divulged, most individuals, imperfectly informed, 
would still not understand. 
96Turner, OR. cit. 
53 
quit. simply impossible tor a single nation to accept sole 
r.spon.ibility tor the most extensive and heinous contlict the 
world had ever known. 97 Th. r.parations s •••• d motivated by 
vengeance and were otherwise dee •• d completely uorealistic. 98 
Tbis evaluation was held by many individuals outside ot Germany, 
but the tact remains that, in the end, Germany could have paid 
the. without suttering mucb more than she did by reneging. 99 
Obviously, it Germany could not accept guilt tor the war, sbe 
would not accept the reparations exacted ot her. For, it she 
w.r. merely the loser in a war, she could well look upen the 
ter.s ot tbe treaty .a exce.sive and vindictive. They must be 
understood in relationship to the guilt clause. It is the 
difterence between the sentences meted out tor tirst-degree 
murder and manslaughter. 
There was and i8 in Germany, as well as in every other 
part ot the world, a sincere beliet that not only is war 
natural to man, it is a positive goOd. lOO The theory popular-
ized by Darwin, survival ot the tittest, io some ways shocked 
the world and disturbed ita complacency. But in and ot itselt, 
97 -Foerster doe. not agr.e with this, he insista that 
it was not only possible but n.c.ssary tor Germany and the 
world. Ue teared the consequences ot an unrepentant Germany. 
The Second World War had not yet begun. 
Foerster, Ope cit., p. 35. 
98The general opinions ot most coamentators past and 
present accords with this-See Eyck, Vol. It p. 106. 
99 Foerster, OPe cit., p. 35. 
IOOaernhardi, 0 • cit. p. 11. 
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it holds a strong attraction in general tor fascists and 
racists 1n particular. In war one observed this theory 
operating at its higbest level. War, according to Prussian 
thinking, is a Deoessary and beneficial state of affairs. It 
does away with the weaklings of society and gives the strong 
man a cbance to beeo.e heroes. Without war, it is held by 
so.e, civilization is doo.ed. lOI Abov. all otber groups, th. 
Prussians exe.plify tbis attitud •• IOa External peace for 
th •• would be immoral, an unnatural state. The League, however, 
is founded upon the principle that war ought to be excluded 
a. a .eans of settling internatioRa! disputes. The Firat 
World War .ertainly de.oDstrated the !apotence of war as a 
dispute-s.ttling a.chanisa. For it did not .ettle anything. 
Tbe proof of tbis could be .een in the inexorable move.ent 
toward a second and even more dreadlul world conflict. The 
seeds for that war were already.... by the ti.e the peace 
w ... ottled. Those who were responsible tor putting together 
tbe League as a functioning organization and working within 
it. lr .. ework were tar Ie •• advanced in tbeir thinking than 
tbe theorists who established its principle., and what i •• ore 
i.par.ant, did not give it their lull .easure of understanding. 
IUllbi4.t p. 18. 
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For the British Foreign Ottice, the Covenant was conceived .s 
an improved and enlarged Concert ot Europe, so tor President 
Wilson the Covenant was an improved and enlarged Monroe 
Doctrine. IOa In accord with this reasoning, the Britisb did 
not want guarantees written into the Covenant. Since they 
conceived the League as rather a aore institutionalized con-
tinuation of tbe cooperation of the great powers, tbey did 
not want obligations as part of the arrangement. I04 There 
was no tradition upon whicb to found sucb a system, and 
lacking such, there was utter pesst.l •• as to its eCticacy. 
Considering the British attitude toward this questioD, and 
their retusal to concur In the Japane.e ettorts to include in 
the Cov.nant a statellent relating to discrimination because of 
race or nationality, one wonders what they expected to create 
with thi~ ne. League. 
The French, at least the jurists, .eemed more amenable 
to the spirit of the League as enUDciated by Wilson. Part of 
the reason for tbis ia tbe French legal syst •• and, hence, the 
French legal mind. The le,al settle.ent of dispute. reach.s 
tor its touchstone toward a fairly high level of jurisprudence. 
An internatioaal court of arbitration could not b ••• tablished 
on common-law principles. In order tor such a court to begia 
lOSZi .. ern, 02. git., p. 216. 
I04Ibid., p. 245. 
-
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functioning in an already complex world it would have, of neces-
sity, to work from a full set of codified laws. Furthermore, in 
settling a case at arbitration, previous cases may not be cited 
as ruling precedents. lOS It is acknowledged that each case 
is unique, that the circumstances, considering the nations 
involved, and the coaplex and ever changing relationships 
among nations, make it impossible to apply the findings of one 
cast to any other. Of course, the previous verdict. are re-
corded and referred to for insight, but tbey do not constitute 
a determining tactor to the resolution of any subsequent case. 
AD international court tben must operate on tbe basis of civil 
law. A court system founded on sucb principles of necessity 
must concern itself more witb evolving tbeory, and in this 
area the French jurists were particularly adept. Tbey were 
better prepared to view tbe League as an entirely new aystem. 106 
And tbey were more willing, in tbeory, to experiaent. In 
reality, it was the politics of tbe situation tbat ruled.107 
105J • L. Brierly. "The Law of Nations" (New York: 
Odtord University Press, 1981), p. si. 
106 Ziamern, oe, cit., p. 188. 
I07YlSScber. OPe cit., p. 75. "La Faix du monde ne 
a'organis. pas dans 1 'assirait. L'organisation international., 
a quelque moment ou dans quelque moment ou dans quelques condi-
tions ~utelle se constitute, natt dans un cli.at politique 
donn'. 
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sentiment and even intellect eWl carry the behavior of nations 
only so tar, after which a mor.basic factor becomes operative 
and finally determinatlv.,that of survival. Just as with in-
dividuals, states revert 1amediately to primitive behavior 
under extraord.inary circumstances. War is such a. circUlistance. 
In tbe last extremity, a state .mploys those aethods which are 
aost taaili&r, and when tie. is wanting, judge. the actions of 
other state. on the basis of historical aaalysis which may be 
arcbaic and obsolete to such degree that it is completely 
inoperative as a motivating factor 1n that stat.·s behavior. 1OS _ 
There wepe then, on the part of the allies, two rival 
conceptions of tbe League: 
For Britain it remained a co-operative associ-
ation of independent states. For the French 109 
it was an incomplete project of a super-state. 
Just as the French vi •• was conditioned by their civil law 
heritage, the ancient legal institutions and systeas ot Great 
Britain prepared ber to approach the Covenant as she did with 
an attitude of reluctance toward specifying in advance what 
action members were to take under 6iven circumstances. It was 
the habit ot the British nation, very pragmatically to .eal 
with situations as they arose in whatever manner which •••• ed 
hest suited tor the 000888ioo. In the operation of the vast 
1000oerster, OR. eil., p. IS. 
l09Z1amern, op. eil., p. 346. 
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Britisb Empire, sucb flexibility was well tailored to tbe 
heterogeneous needs or situations which at tl .. s required wbat 
appeared to be conflicting policies. In order to understand a 
nation which operate. in tbis fashion, it is necessary to study 
its history over an extended period gradually building up a 
framework against wbicb the individual acts and policies of the 
nation may be evaluated. With regard to the appreciation that 
. both Germany and France bad of Britisb motivation, Zimmera 
wrote: 
In spite or their constant contacts with 
British statesmen, extending in M. Briand·. 
case over a great lIany years, both he and 
Berr stres •• ana .ere fundamentally ignorant 
about Great Britain and the British Common-
wealth.110 
This lack ot understanding between states made the 
work of tounding the League more difficult and doomed its 
functioning, at least in the more essential areas, to l"rustra-
tion and ultimate tailure. lll It precluded the possibility 
for meaningful dialogue, and was largely responsible tor the 
fact that while the meBbers came to accept the principles ot 
the League in theory. they bad Dot the slightest belief in 
their practical application. The machinery for keeping the 
peace was in existence, but DO one cared to push the buttoD, 
110Ib&d. t p. 338. 
111Yisscher, OR. ell •• p. 81. 
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neitber those who believed the macbinerr would work, nor thoae 
who were certain it would not; the former because tbey could 
not, in tbe tinal .oaent, accept that which contradicted their 
tradition, heredity, and experience; the latter tor obvious 
reasons. 
The majority ot Germans belonged to tbe two categories 
above. Under those circumstances, the question imposes itselt 
as to how they determined upon membership in that organization. 
Returning to the vie. or politics as the art of tbe posslble, 
. their action was quite appropriate. The man who led them 
through it then, Gustave streseaann, 8ust be admired tor the 
auecessful manner 1n whicb he practiced the art. That this 
involved duplicitr on tbe level of of Ii cia 1 proaunciation ot 
policy was inev1table.112 To provide a ca.pletelr detailed 
account of all the factors taken into consideration in the 
tor.ulation ot policy would be impossible, and if so.ewhow 
;"t:~, 
sebieved, would itself prove a talsehooel. There is no oUle .. 
course open to the leader of a nation. In the bargaining 
process tbat is international polities be 8ust try for the 
best deal be can get. The language be •• ploys to sell it to 
both aide. can not uaually be ldenttcal. Gatzke in him mooo-
graph 
taced 
on rearaa.ent rollowlng World War It implies tbat 
II~Gatzk.t ~e. cit., p. 111. "It tbis policy was 
that was not entIrely streB •• ann's tault." 
two-
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stresemann might have been lying when he steered Ger.any into 
the League. ll3 A recent study of stresemann and his politics 
takes the position that the answer is tbe most obvious: be 
simply was extremely pragmatic, or, more specifically, a 
pragmatic conservative. ll4 liber. the line betweeu pragaatis. 
and opportunism is drawn remains a valid question. His transi-
tion from opponent to proponent of the new regime constitutes 
the most controversial facet of his career. The explanations 
most oCten prof1"ered are those of conversion or the above tuen-
tloned opportunism, the choice usually coinciding with the 
tone of the critique. i~t.ver the cas., the political situa-
tion within Geraan7 after the war was near-chaos. Steea'ing 
aIlTthing tbl'ough sucb a morass in continual flux required 
incredible dexterity" A sial)le narration of the facts makes 
one dizzy. ~~e mo.t intricate. and at the same time most 
significant, .aneuvering was that eaployed in the ratification 
of the Locarno 'freaty whioh had as an add.ed effect Germany's 
entry into the League. ll5 This dual nature constituted both 
a help and a hindrance in this regard. Hindenburg. then 
pre.ident, still vitally important to the decision-making pro-
ce.8 t was unalterable opposecl to German membership in tile 
Leaguo. ae was, bowever, favorably disposed to the Locarno 
1I3Gatzke, gR. cit., 115. 
114 ll5Turner, ci1., p. 263. 
• •• • 
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Pact, largely won over through the efforts of Hans Luther, 
Chancellor ot Germany. Stresetlaon·s diplomacy had to be exer-
cised with the same skill in the bandling of the factions 
within Germany, and the .ulti~le interests on the foreign scene. 
In large measure, this meant playing one oft against the other. 
To French Foreign Minister Briand, for example, be insisted 
that he must have certain concessions to placate the German 
National Pt)oples Part,. (DNVP).116 To the recalcitrant splinter 
parties he argues that Gernu.lJ'l1 IIU8t agree to various proposals 
in order to win the trust of France and so. by acceptance into 
the League, reap benetits in every quarter. To indicate the 
broad compass ot strese.ann'. thought. it is 1a"ortant to note 
that be viewed the responsibilities, and at the same time the 
opportunities, 0,1 tbe League in the econollic sphere very 
seriously. II? To wbat degree this too constituted a lIotivating 
faotor in Stre8e.t~·. drive tor German .~mber8hlp in the 
League can not be lIeuured. Most important. however, was the 
mor6 basic question ot G ..... aay·s place in the sun. Beyond the 
respect that would naturally accrue to the boldeA" of III peraaaeat 
seat in the League Caune!l was the tact that Germany could best 
look atter ber own interests trom within one of the deliberative 
bodi •• that concerned itself with questions that lIust afleet 
IIft1bid •• p. ~12. 
117zimmern. Opt eil •• p. 363. 
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her well-being. As a permaDent mail"e,' of tbe League Council 
sbe would. enjoy a veto power with ree;"u'd to any League busineaa 
that affected ~lGr vital interests. In the vrocess of drawin.g 
up the Covenant of tbe League, certain pl'eSUPllositiona bad 
profoun~ elfects upon its operation as well as on its theoritl-
cal foundations. One such premise was the concept of universa-
lity of Dlcm!>ersbip.118 This l8~cmt that the founders of the 
League felt tbat relations among nations could ba better con-
trolled if the nations "ere witbin rather than outside the 
organization. Uniortunatel,-,tbeory was not supported by prac-
tice. The question of sanctiuns against members was less 
complicated. Tile relationship between the lIe.ber nations ot 
the League could be specifically defined. But it is much more 
difficult to n~,otlate terms with a party when the very lrame-
. work of the negotiations must first be deter.ined upon, and 
t'lere is no casual way to initiate talks. 'fhis remained the 
common belief in spite of the widespread skepticism with regard 
to the efficacy or the League machinery tor settliug dislJutea. 
Thus most at the members of the League were anxious for GermaDT 
to join the League, including her archenemy, France. The 
British, who as indicated above, conceived the League as an 
institutionalization of the balance of power, considered that 
IIa 801z, ORe ci~. 
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that balance was best achieved by having Germany a aeaber, and 
furthermore a permanent member, of the Council. Germany was 
an integral part of Europe. She was, of necessity, a part of 
the mainstream that was generating a modern international world 
"characterized by general eonventions of wide scope but uncer-
tain duration. nl19 The League created a great "atreaa of 
perpetual international activity:"120 After signing the Treaty 
of Versailles, Geraany was not kindly disposed toward the 
League. Ber relationship with that organization was "very 
queer and awkward." According to Walter S18ons, Chief Justice 
of the Supre.. r'ederal Court of Genuy I 
Sbe had been forced to sign the) OQveaant but 
was not allowed to beco.e a meaber; she had 
all the obligations but none of the rights 
of aembership. This mark of utter disdain 
shown by a society of twenty-se~~n Datioaa 
against a people they had 1nvit~d to sign a 
peace treaty embittered the Germans, the 
great majority of who. were, atter the War, 
quite wililng to take a heavy load on their 
shoulders in order to restore good will beI21 
tween theaselves and their toraer en.aiea. 
It must be rellellbered. however, that tbis was not a situation 
involving equals--it concerned vietors and vanquished. As to 
the Idea that Germany was forced to sign the Vera.ill.a Treaty. 
that i& quite true. So recalcitrant were they in that relard 
1105i.ons, Inter_etlon.l Law since Grotius, p. 131 
120Ibld., p. 131. 
121Ibid• 
that it was teared that alter live brutalizing years 01 light-
ing, the allied would once more bave to resort to arms to make 
Germany sign the document.122 As to tbe allegation that she 
was burdened with obligations without concurring rights, tbe 
tact is that the obligations were a part of the Treaty of whicb 
the League was also a part. It was under tbe Treaty, not the 
Covenant, that tbe obligations occurred. It was no surprise 
to anyone that the League proved unequal to the task ot re-
solving the political probl •• s ot the world. On tbe other 
hand. it didprove amazingly successtul in its evolution as an 
administrative entity. It carried torward the practice ot 
general technical conterences relating to problems ot commerce, 
health, labor, and trat.tic, and especially econollic matters. 
The tact that tbe League was weak poli ticall.,. and strong 
ecbnoaically 1s precisely wbat attracted Germany wbo never 
tully accepted its political role, but was desperately interes-
ted in economic development. Against tbis approacb. Briand 
bad managed to forge a vision which reconciled very broad inter-
national issues witb national French interests. It was through 
his collaboration with stresemann that German membership was 
ettected.123 When stresemann used party tactions as a lever 
122 .' ..... . 
8yck. 221:CI:.tt,. t Vol. It p. 102. 
l23For his part, Briand was awarded the Nobel peace 
Prize, in 1926, the year Germany became a member ot the League. 
I , 
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to gain French concessions, Briand, in his turn, held up the 
intransigence or Poincare 88 a countermeasure. On the whole, 
the attitude of the French leaders toward Ge'-Man entrance into 
the lAngue was tar better than one might have supposed on the 
part of the chie! sufferer under the German military onslaught. 
It is true that the French were largely responsible for keeping 
Germany out of the League directly after the war. 124 It was 
France which was the most insistent instigator of the repara-
tions terms which were construed as disguised vengeance. Yet 
her belief in the mode of operation of the League ~nd the nature 
of the relationships established thereby was closer to the idea 
of the lounders than that of her sister states. One of the 
great German co.mentators, Foerster, felt thot bis country 
would oD.ly learn bow to behave in the Modern international world 
by accepting the guilt clause that proved 80 obnoxious to them, 
so necessary to the French t and so eontroversi.al to all 
nattons. 12S Penance must be done if Germany were to assnme her 
rightful place U1I1olg the major nations of the earth. Untortunate-
ly, n collective conscience is not made stronger by the numher 
124Eyck , oe: cit., Vol I, p. 112. 
12.Sprof •• sor·Friedricb \\ilhel. Foerster was editor ot 
the pacifist mngazine, "D1e Menscheit- in Wieshaden. He was 
tbe butt of an attack by Str •••• ann who vi.wed his complaints 
of secret German rearmament as injurious to Germ~my's interests. 
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of individual. involved. The idea ~hat harsh terms ot peace 
would teacb Ger.any that she had sinned against her tellow 
states and so torce her to mend ber ways seems to go beyond 
human experience. An analogy can be drawn between national 
and individual conscience, but the eomparison remains an 
analogy, it do •• not become an identity. It might be possible 
for an individual to go through painful self-analysis and, in 
the process ot revelatioo, experience catharsis. A nation can 
not go quite that tar. It would have taken the most funda-
•• ntal and universal understanding on the part of the German 
people to accowplish such a change ot character. This they 
could not do tor .everal reasons. 
Given the historical setting of Europe in the early 
twentieth century, no state could have survived which was 
given to basic sell_doubt. l26 Aftar the unprecedented catas-
trophe ot World WarI, tbose nations Most sorely affected lived 
on by p9wer ot will alone. All power of whatever variety is 
limi ted. The amount of power that can be exercised over (Ul 
area is inversely proportionate to the extent of the area. 
Germany could not exercise the mania that made her an ,outlaw 1n 
the war and still preserve her soeio-eennomic viability. To 
discard her phi.losophy lvould have been tantamount to giving up 
her nationhood. When Foerster cried out in alarm over the 
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dangers inherent in German I>bilosophy be could not have known 
127 wbat he presaged. In his darkest thoughts be could not have 
imagined the facts ot World War II. It was only alter that 
second holocaust that scholars returned to the philosophy of 
which Foerster spoke, to discover in more detailed and orderly 
fashion, what he was talking about. 
In crisis situations it is axiomatic that tne behavior 
or individuals and states alike reverts to primordial res-
ponses. 128 In the tace or present danger, the act or reactioD 
of self-preservation is not experimental. It is experiential. 
&ven when the situation itself is the result of, or in the 
context of, an experiment, tinal resort will be to learned 
responses. One may examine briefly the Bolshevik Revolution 
whicb was, in many ways, a wholly new experiment. When the 
revolution was threatened from within, tbe machinery of the 
old Taarist state was employed to sustain it. tVhen it was 
threatened j'rom \yitbout by annihilation at the hands of the 
German forces, the atheistic Communists i.plored the Church to 
exhort its members to fight for God and country. It was no 
longer "Fight tor tbe party," but "Fight tor Holy Mother 
Itussia." 
I2'Erich Eycl(t writing in 1956 said, "Today who can 
still accuse Foerster of baving painted too black a picture or 
of havint; eX8l;gerated?" Eyck, 0p. c~~., Vol. II, p. 132. 
128~eber, ~P. cit. 
~ . 
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This same period witnessed the Socialists making great 
strides in all the countries of Europe.129 Several legisla-
tures had a considerable representation of Socialists, and in 
France, the premiership was held by a man who <!esignated him-
self a socialists. Socialist ideology was at a peak, and 
recruitment among the workers grew 3pace. A sign1.ficant tenet 
of this theory was an Avowed love tor peace. It the countries 
of Europe declared war, the socialists .. ,ould declare i)eace by 
refusing to fight in the armies or even to work to sustain 
the war effort. In the end, the first note of martial music 
banished every other tune trom the heads ot these international ' 
stalwarts. 130 Instead of tbe generals bowing betore the an-
ticlp~tcd general strike of the workers, the workers disposed 
themselves to obey the generals. The real had not kept pace 
with the ~deal. 
The League of Nations as envisioned before the war 
bad as one of its characteristics the insintence upon univer-
sality of membership. It was, however, the old Jdea of member-
ship restrictnd to civilized nations 1,.,ith Eurorte as the center 
of gravity. Even after the outbreaJ{ of hostili tics, members 
of both sides of the conflict worked on the basis of 
1~9Unrvey Goldberg. The Life of Jean Ja"u~es. (WadisoBa 
University of Wisconsin Press. 196~', p. 485. 
130 Tuchman, ~. c~t •• p. 462. 
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universality, or at least titeir thoughts includvd the member-
ship of defeated nations.13l While the concept of tne League 
was fast growing from an ivory-towered dream to a factor of 
real I~olitics, there was still an admixture of idealism, of 
expected behavior, of theory which was yet too advanced for the 
real world, a world which included "back-room" politicians; 
which included, on the parts of ~Aany p~rticipants from the more 
democratic nations, accountability to constituents. The con-
stituents were not accounted for in earlier discussion of the 
League. The question then was moot; there was no need to go 
beyond assuII1>tions. But at the moment of truth, t.h.il\gs do not 
always fall into place as it was presumed they would. Little 
rougb edges suddenly can stop the entire process.h'hat could 
not be accounted for in theory suddenly became vital. What 
was ignored because it could not be measured or could not be 
predicted wi ttl accuracy at once const:i tuted an insurmountable 
obstacle. 
So it is with the idealist, the great humanitarian wito 
loves mankind but hates his neighbors. So even the ancient 
hatred of JI'rench for German became tho ruling lactor in the 
exclusion of Germany from League membership. It is possible 
to suppose that if Itnly di~] not behave as usual and cbange . 
sides in mid-course she would have enjoyed a bettor ch~mce of 
131Eyck, op_ cit., p. 112. Jackh, op_ cit also discusses 
this tlUestion. 
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being accepted in the League even though sbe ended the war on 
the wrong side as a defel1ted nation. To be sure, there were 
other significant ditferanCtHJ. No olle particularly feared 
Italy. She did not bave the potential for world con(~est or 
domination, even though her attack on Ethiopia was allowed to 
pass unchecked by the members of tlle League when tha,t body 
voted sanctions some years later. 
There is more to the failure of the United states 
finally to join the League than tbat President ~ilson used 
poor political judgment in not bringin~; with him to the ,)ro-
eeedings members of the Senate who must approve treaties made 
by the chief executive, and representatives from the opposing 
political party who must play a part in so dramatic a step as 
United states involvameatln the fabric of European and world 
political affairs. Americans still nurtured grave suspicions 
ot the Continent. The words of George Washington abjuring 
involvement in toreign affairs are engraved a.s a inl;radicable 
part of their personality and character. It is the view ot 
one German historian that: nTheEuropeans did in tact concede 
13') the League of Nations to the Presiuent as a will...... ... In-
deed. the continental mentality more and more determined the 
actual operE.l.tion of the League. 133 
132n h' 't 121 ve 10. op. Cl. •• , p. .• 
133Ib1d •• p. 122. 
11 
Tbus when tbe final moment arrived, the reaotion was 
irrational, based upon response. that could not be .easured 
and bence were not weighted properly in the assessment ot the 
League founders. When imponderables do exist. tbere is always 
the tendency to give thea too much or too little account wben 
reckoning a course ot action. The probl.. is similar to 
deteraining wbicb tacet of man's nature governs his existence. 
It one subscribe. to the notion that he is a rational creature, 
one must predicate rationality .s the decisive tactor in deter-
mining his course ot action. It is very unpleasant tor the 
idealist to contemplate overlong the irrational side ot aants 
behavior. 
Final determination of the governing principles at 
me.bership in an international organization seems as yet no 
.ore susceptible to concrete resolution than is the question 
ot admitting a specific State. Tbe problem is epitomized in 
the case ot Geraanyts ad.ission to the League. 
In a paper on the League delivered betore the Grotius 
Society in 1917, F. N. Keen stated: "The inclusion of any 
states that are regarded as likely disturbers ot the peace 
is particularly desirable, for they will be more easily con-
trolled if they are ins1de, than it they are outside the 
League.·134 Across the Atlantic nearly one year later Williaa 
lSiGrotiu8 Society proceedin6s, Vol. II, 1917, p. 131. 
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Howard Taft addressed the convention of the League to Enforce 
Peace at .Madison, Wisconsin. On the question of whether 
Germany should be let into the League. he asserted: "That 
depends upon whether Germany lIake. berself fit tor tbe 
League.,,135 She lIuat show by her actions that she has learned 
the lessons "whicb the war should teach her." Taft did not 
elaborate at the ti.e on how Geraany was to demonstrate her 
tltnes. for membership, but France was later to use this 
approacb and be very specific about what was to be deemed 
sufficient proo.! for redeRlption. 
Pre.ident Woodrow Wilson, wbo was personally so lIuch 
responsible for the League, had in .ind a homogeneous League 
ot d.mocratic nations. In a speech delivered at Oakland. 
California, in SepteRlber of 1919, Wilson said: "You read in 
the newspapers that there are intrigues going on In Germany 
tor the restoration of something like the old lovernment ••• 
very .. ell, it that sbould be accomplished, Germany is tor-ever 
excluded tro. the League of Nations. It is not our business 
to say to the German people wbat sort of government they shall 
have ••• but It is our business to say whom we will keep company 
with." 
135wi11iam Howard Taft. ~. Oblig.tlons ot Victor,' 
an address delivered at the conveD:lon 01 t6e League to fn orce 
Peace at Madison, ~isconsin, under the auspices of the Univers-
ity ot W1800nsin, November 9, 1918. 
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Neither the Americans nor the British realized the 
absolute necessity of. getting away from the sovereign state.136 
In this sense one might speak of an Anglo-American conception 
of the League which derived from the fact that England. as 
well as the United States, had in a very real sense been out-
side most wars and troubles. 137 England had played the policy 
of the balance ot power. Thus sbe wanted a "round table" where 
diplomats could exhibit the results of their works. Th. French, 
according to the position espoused by Leon 8ourceois138 who 
laid such stress on Article Nine of the Covenant, did see the 
necessity of evolving a society capable of preserving inter-
national law and order, with provision for peaceful change, 
There anst be an authority which is in so •• way.$upranational. 
This conc.pt in no way ailitated against the French taking an 
approach toward Germany tbat would insure here exclusion froa 
the original ae.bership 1n the League and delay her entry 
tragically long. 
l~IThe tera "absolute necessity" ubvisouly does not 
stand as a prerequisite for survival, but rather for the in-
sured success of a meaningful and Viable international organi-
zation. 
l37Waliers, op, cit •• p. 31. 
138Leon Bourgeois was President of the Council of Siate 
·of France. and served as t.he first president of the League of 
Council., 
IY. THE ENTRANCE OF GERMANY INTO 
THE LEAtKJE 
In 1918 at the Reich.tag a debate was held regarding 
the League ot Nations. Friedrich Naumann protested: 
It puzzles many and myself that in the think-
ing regarding the League, as Wilson puts it to 
us, everything is already prepared in "einzelnen." 
We must look upon it as the foreaost problem in 
the world ••• But to Germans it is no strange 
work. Where did the idea of "Wenscbenheits-
entwicklung" stem from? Not originally trom 
Lloyd George and Wilson ••• it is Much older and 
deeper, tor example in the work at Lessing: 
"Erziebung des Menschengeschlechts", or Kanta 
"Yom ewigen Frieden" ••• and a wbole brilliant 
row of great thinkers up to Hegel. It was the 
thought in whicb the generation of our grand-
fathers was realized. We must sit again at the 
feet of our ancesters and learn from the spring 
of wisdom how we can1£,ow .ell after tbis un-believable upheaval. 3 
The magazine "Die Hilfe" proclaimed: It the German people were 
COllvinced of the efficacy of the League, Wilson would have no 
finer partners. Atter 80 much war we wish more than any other 
nation for demilitarization. 140 
There is, according to German historians, an over-
whelming history of German t.hought in the direction ot an 
139Jickh , 
140Ibid _., 
op. cit •• p. 9. ~ranslation by uuthor. 
pp. 11-12. 
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organization tor ensuring the peace. It is a product of the 
m08t mystical thinkers of Ge~any, her greatest philosophers. 
The question which logically tollows is whether or not this 
spirit was alive during the Great War. 
Ret~rence may be made in this regard to many contem-
porary articles which present impressive evidence that such 
spirit was not only alive but had moved into the realm ot the 
political.141 The specialist in international law, Walter 
Schueking, wrote powertully tor such an idea in "Der Welttrie-
densbund," 1916, and "Der Bund der Volker," 191? He even 
.uggested, in 1915, to Betbaann-Hollweg's .eeretary of state 
Zimmeraann that the adainistration ought to officially 
acknowledge ge "Volkererbundgedanken." Tbe i".diate retort 
was characteristic tor the regime wherein the political 
weakness contrasted with the intluence of the military: "Yes, 
protessor, but if we were to do that, wbat would our generals 
. and naval officers say to U.?" 
This factor is not to be forgotten: the government 
even before the war, but .specially during it, was in practice 
subordinate to the military. So deeply, however, was the 
Id •• of the League ingrained in the Ger.an mind. even the 
height ot war did not remove it. On the twenty-second of May 
1916, 
Juni, 
Be thaann-Hollweg, during an interview, joined Sir Edward 
141JabresversammluDl de. neutscben Werkbundes. 14 
1916. 
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Grey in a statement supporting a aituation "in which tree and 
equal nations reduced their araaments and settled their dit-
terence. through arbitration instead of war." Later on t in 
November ot that year, Betn.ann-Hollweg saids "Germany is 
prepared at any time to join a League ••• ,,142 
The pre.s at the tiae ,_ve a.e.ingly unitied assent. 
Hans Uelbruck wrote in the "Preuiaischen Jabrbuchern:" 
"Pacitis.· is no longe .. a move.ent ot ideals and dre8lls t but a 
broadly based need of peoples and states, and to embrace 
pacitis. is truly political reality." 
Ernst Jackh expressed the conviction that a ne. order 
waa to be .stablished no matter wbo was the victor in the war!43 
He *ad. this assertion a tull six month. bet ore a like senti-
ment was enunciated by Woodrow Wilson. 
All tbe political parties in Geraany shared this view 
except the Conservatives. The Cabinet was agreed upon entrance 
into the League and repeated its willingness to ratify such a 
move as late as the 24th of April, 1919. That wast of course, 
before Venaailles. FinallYt in V.rsaille. itaelf there was an 
exchange of notes between the Gera&l peace delegation and 
14~It sbould be kept in mind that these sentiments 
were being expressed by the regime, and were not shared by the 
military, nor by aembers from opposition parties. They were 
then t the expression of a minority. 
143JAckh-Scbwarz, Ope ciS. 
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Georges Clemenceau. The result was negative. 
By the end ot January 1921, at the international 
Conference in Paris, a tormal objection against the acceptance 
to membership of Germany was announced. Tbe League was es-
tablished not only without the German nation, "but even against 
the German nation," Germany was to be made to feel "as an 
outlaw, as morally depraved."144 
The actuality was that the League was not a new order 
but an instrument of maintaining the difference between victor 
and vanquished, Arnold J. Tppbbee, noted historian, in one ot 
a series ot discussions held at Chathaa 80use, London, main·-
tained that, 
As the Germans see it, and they see it more 
clearly though;, not necessarily more truly, 
the victors imposed peace on their deteated 
enemies, and, in order to maintain the settle-
mentl decided to rope in ,outsiders. The League , is a 80, as the Germans see it, an atte.pt to 
circumvent Nature; and its "unnaturalness" is 
a still more serioua tlaw than its "injustice" 
since the l!lsof Nature is not fixity but mutability. 
H. G. Wells said in the same vein: "The League ot Nations i. 
an organization which was imposed on them (Germany) to keep 
them down by torce to the advantage ot the victor." In his 
fi4Arnold J. Toynbee. participating in discussions at 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 
London, 1936. 
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book: "Aaerican Diplomacy," G. F. Keonan concluded that" ••• 
the progress ot World War I did not bring reasonableness, or 
bumility, or the spirit of compromise to the warring peoples:146 
In spite ot all, the allied nations gradually grew out 
ot their war psychosis ot the traditional enemy, slowly to a 
rational political position. For Germany is the geographical 
heart ot Europe. Europe can no live without its heart, nnt 
can Germany live without its body. The way ot Germany into the 
League was long, and the League itselt a quite difterent entity 
tbat that envisioned by the various League of Nations societies 
around the world. Europe stood on the threshold of a new age, 
but it stepped back, not forward. Wby had the hoped-for birth 
of a new world order ended in aiscarriage? 
The defeat whicb came to the German sra'.s and their 
allies was as sudden as it was catastrophic. The German people 
in general believed almost to the last that thFly were going to 
emerge victorius. The "Memoirs" of General Erich Ludendorft14? 
indicate that on the eigh1b of August 1918, it burst upon his 
consciousness that the morale of the army was giving way. By 
the end ot that month he informed the Chancellor that tbere must 
be no delay in seeking for peace. In the two montbs followlng, 
lilleonen, oe. cit., p. 56. 
147Erlcb Ladendortt, Ueinelrie,serlnnerun,en, 1914-191§, 
Berlin, 1919. 
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the people became aware ot their plight and it became apparent 
that tbey were hard against the face of unconditional surrender. 
The political situation was in chaos. and the stabilizing force 
oftbe military dissipated into confusion. Conditions in 
Germany were far worse in all respects than anything experienced 
by the Allies. Tbe so called "turnip winter" of 1916-1917 had 
exacted a beavy toll of forbearance, and all the tre.endous 
suffering and endless endurance of the people of tbat nation 
bad availed tbea naught. 
The German Eapire of the half-century culminating in 
World War I was powerful to be sure. But it would have to be 
described as an autocracy, and so. in the end, vulnerable. tor 
the roots of such systems do not go deeply into tbe soil. 
History teaches that sucb forms of government are the moat 
likely to be overthrown by revolution. Allegiance tbere may 
be, but it is to tbe rulers, not the government. If those 
rulers sbould lose their coercive powers ~ charismatic attrac-
tions, the bonds of obedience are seyered and with tbem the 
confidence and support of the people. The Germans particularly 
are practiced in obedience. But as in all things there are 
. limits, and wben the •• have been exceeded tbe inevitable result 
i. revolution. 80\it ... in Germany_ The old regime had 
excited great entbusiasm and pride among the vast majority of 
its citizens. Yet no one raised a band or gun to stay the 
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sweeping away of the government or its dynastic ••• bers. What 
saved the nation froM untold additional violence and bloodsbed 
was the Socialist Party which was well organized, moderate, 
and strong. There was also at work the cbaracter of tbe people 
themselves whicb was so given to orderly conduct of affairs. 
For example, after the turn of tbe century, tbe various social-
ist parties of Europe met in Germany to discuss the overall 
party progr~. ~onl the questions to be resolved was that of 
the status of the party and its individual members regarding 
peace, and More particularly, tbe conduct of war. Socialist 
theory rejeots war as a .eans of .ettling disputes bet.een 
nations. Further.ore, there were SOMe socialists wbo believed 
that war at this time would hasten ihe deMise of Capitalism. 
They were doubly interested in seeing that the working-class 
people did not support the war effort in any way_ The question 
was how to express this as internat10nal socialist policy. As 
far as the German party was concerned, tbey would not call a 
general strike to express their oppOSition to the war, nor 
would they refuse to fight. As one of the leaders of the 
German socialists put it: The Germans were far too accustomed 
to obedience and an orderly civil life to engage in wholesale 
anarchy_ They were also too strongly imbued with the BotioB 
01 V.terlaod not to respond to a call to arms. Thi. is, of 
course. a very general statement. The exceptions were numerous 
81 
and iMporiani. Nonetheless, ibe Socialists bad already iaken 
office in ihe Coalition Cabinei under Prince Max of Baden, and 
so were in straiegic positions io take control wben order was 
moai sorely needed. The pariy managed t ai a very critical 
period, to suppress the dangerously anarcbisiic Spariacists, 
and to provide inatead for general elections with universal 
trancbise a scani iwo aontbs atier the revolution. l48 
Prince Max von Baden had banded ihe presidency over 
to Friedrich Ebert in 1919 who direcied Hugo Preuss, a Berlin 
protessor, to draw up an outline for a Consiituiion for tbe 
Republic. Considerable work had been done before the new 
Parl1aaent .et at Weimar, and this formed ihe basis for commit-
tee discussion. The ~utline received extensive alteration 
before being accepted in 1919. One of the chief factors eli8i-
nated was a .cbeae for dividing tke influence of Prussia. The 
re.ult, noneiheles., was tbe creaiion of a truly democratio 
doeuaent. Each •• aber state Must be republican in for., and 
ulii.Qie power r •• ide. In the people. Further, states' rights 
were limited and the Federation more clo.ely knit than under 
the Constitution of Blsmarck. 
Procedures for i.ple.enting the de.ocratic principle 
are of espeCial note. Universal Buffrage was extended to 8ucb 
148yax von Baden. Erinn.runsen und Dokua.nte, 
Stuttgart, 1920. 
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degree as to eomprise more than fifty per cent of the popula-
tion. The president was popularly elected, but had only limited 
powers. Electoral districts were determined geographically 
without regard for state boundaries. An added novelty, the 
Reichsliste. produced a situation in wbich the individual can-
didate was virtually e1iJainated to the aggrandizement of the 
strongest and best organized Parties. The implications of this 
were to be felt lIuch later in the history of the Weimar Repub-
lic. 
In the course ot framing the Constitution the German 
people retrieved a measure of hope for the future of the 
Republic~ But at that moment the teras of the Treaty of 
Versailles were announced. 149 The Weimar Assembly was split 
asunder. There were tbose among the allies who teared that 
hostilities would have to be renewed betore Germany would 
accept the terms ot settlement. Tbe treaty was accepted largely 
through the auspices ot Matthias Erzberger. perhaps the most 
influential man in the government at the time. 150 The result, 
however, was the rise ot the "extrelle Right. Resentment 
~' 
against the treaty was tocused upon the Socialists who were so 
largely responsible for its acceptance. The m08t bitter re-
action to til" treaty wa.s provoked by the clause therein whicb 
14§uatthiaa Erzberger. Der V~lkerbunda der We, zom 
Welt Frieden, Berlin. 1918. 
150Yattbiaa Erzberger, Erlenbniss i. Weltkriel. Stutt-
, 
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held thut the entire responsibility for the outbreak of the war 
was placed on the shoulders of Germany and her allies. Indeed, 
the Schuldfrage has perdured even to this day. Included, for 
good or ill, as part and parcel or tbe Treaty of Versailles 
was the Covenant of the League at Nations. That a world organi-
zation ot sovereign and equal states should be bound up with a 
treaty forcing terms of peace and reparations upon de.reated 
nations must certainly be considered unfortunate. It was, in 
the mind of its foremost proponen"t. President Wilson, a politi-
cal necessity. In his view, if it were not made a part of the 
terms ot peace, once the peace was settled it might never 
co.e into existence. Such might well be the case. But in 
making it a facet of the peace settlement it became identified 
as a instrument of the victors in subduing the vanquished. 
Though virtually all the world was at one time or another re-
presented within it. assembly, it retained the aura or a 
political alliance. First the Allied powers versus the Axi. 
nations, then the Democratic states versus the Bolsheviks, then 
again the Allied nations versus the Axis powers. It is against 
thisconcept that German progress toward the League is to be 
studied. 
'rh. German Chancellor, Bethaa8lUl-Hollweg, was profundl,. 
impressed by Sir ~dward Grey's enunciation of the desirability 
or an association of nations. Ue asserted that Germany would 
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not only join sucb a body, but take an active lead in it. In 
tbe midst of tbe war, before there was any inkling of the im-
pending German defeat, Matthias Erzberger began working on 
what was to be tbe first draft of a plan for a League of Nations 
offered by any of the nations involved in tbe conflict.15l 
His scheme was an elaborate one whicb went beyond the Covenant 
in calling for the compulsory arbitration of all disputes. It 
must be said that this was a favorite theme of British thinkers, 
who. for the most part. had little use for tbe idea of main-
taining peace through organization. But as yet they had not 
produced any detailed plans of any sort. All parties did 
finally get about the work of drafting serious plans, but the 
main author of the scheme as ultimately prevailed was President 
Wilson. Tbis tact of itself provoked antagonism on the German 
side for they felt Wilson bad forsaken them in the Peace 
Treaty. There remained, of course, in addition to this, the 
overbearing weight of the victorious powers. Countering this 
was the strong inclination of the parties on tbe Left and 
Center to join with this new institution in building a peaceful 
and democratic world. 152 There is little doubt tbat if Germany 
had been invited into the League at the tim. of its tormation, 
she would certainly bave accepted. Such was tbe avowed wish 
151 Eyck, op. cit., Vol. I. p. 12. 
152JAckb , 0p. cit. 
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of the delegations froID England and the United states. In tile 
end, French intransigence prevailed, and tho course of history 
153 changed. 
From his position as party leader, stresemann used his 
strength in that capacity to support his foreign policy. His 
operations in foreign affairs, for example, the successful 
conclusion he wrought out of the Ruhr-reparations dispute, 
seemed too subtle to be appreciated by the electorate. But 
stresellann was sure in tbe eud that bis accollplishalents would 
show themselves on the domestic scene. »ith this in mind he 
intended to exploit bis achievements abroad to solidify his 
position at bome. The elections of December 1924, confirmed 
Stresellsnn in the path of his own slogan "priaacy of loreign 
policy." Heretofore he had concentrated equally on the domes-
tic implications of bis foreign policy and approached the two 
areas coordinately. After the elections the president ot 
Germany, Ebert, asked him to lona a government. This be agreed 
to do with the condition that if he did not succeed in building 
a coalition cabinet (wbich •• ant bringing in the Nationalists) 
be would refuse the chancellorship. The Centre balked at a 
rightist coalitiou, and a crisis resulted which was resolved by 
the naming of Hans Luther, then Minister of Finance, as the 
new chancellor. stresemann's role as king-maker in this 
153Uerbert Kraus. Zur Frase des Eintritte Deutsch1ands 
in den V~lkerbund Tubin enI9~S. • 
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instance was evident to all observers. He bad achieved a 
special position among the rulers of the Weimar Republic. No 
workable government could be formed without the Deutsche 
Volkspartei of which Stresemann was chairman. Finally, hi. 
succesa in foreign affaira made him one ot the most important 
and indispensable men in Germany both as regards their domestic 
and foreign policy. The nature ot the Versailles Treaty pro-
foundly affected the internal situation in Germany_ 
With the passage of time, the etfects of the Peace 
Treaty were made manifest in both the political and economic 
realm.. They were deleterious in the extreme, destroying vir-
tually all Germansentiaent toward the League. This was due 
largely to action taken by the League other than the terms of 
peace. Chief 880nl these were: the paritlon of Upper Silesia, 
the administration of the Saar, and the occupation ot the 
Ruhr. lS4 
The Upper Silesian problem tell to the League simply 
because the Allie. themselves were unable to reach any com-
promise. Considering the complexity of the situation, the 
added involvement ot a plebiscite, the League did a creditable 
job in resolving wbat was set before it. The German anger 
grew out of the partition itself. Dot the incidentals ot its 
154Eyck• op. cit., pp. 155. 180. 250. 
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being executed. The German ire, untortunately, knew no distinc-
tion. 
The Saar situation was particularly pernicious because 
it represented French imperialism, a fact which would not be 
disguised. That the French attempted to hide behind tne League 
only made things worse. What was nominally entrusted to the 
administration of the League of Nations became a pawn for 
France to play with. 
Beliet in the League as an international body received 
the coup de grace when France occupied the Ruhr and that 
question was never even officially discussed by the League. 
The British made so.e small attempt to have it recognized, but 
were put down at once by the veto ot the French representatives. 
Thus it developed that when an official invitation was 
sent to Berlin in the summer of 1922'to apply for membership, 
Germany declined. Such was the turnabout that she now insisted 
that certain of ber conditions be met before she would enter 
the League. She would not com. in as merely one of the members 
of the Assembly. She must bave her rightful place along with 
the Great Powers who were the permanent members 01 tbe Council. 
Actually, there were very rew who thought that this should not 
be the case. It was only unseemly that Germany should so forth-
rightly de_and it. Many Germans wished to bold out till France 
ended ber occupation of the KUhr, which was considered in viola-
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entire treaty be revised. But there remained in Germany strong 
currents in favor ot bel" as.uming a place witbin the Leu~ue of 
Nations. Among these was the influence ot German pacifism wbo •• 
• ajor spoke .. en were leaders ot bigb repute. The great juriats 
01 the day also exerted themselv •• In bebalf oC ~eague m •• ber-
ship. i\nd countering tbe agit-atlon of tbe rightists was the 
growing rel}rv.entation or internationalist. In the universiti ••• 
. No aatter what the loree. at play .ero within Ger.any, there 
.as no hOI)e for her joining the League, and previous little 
hope tor ~urope until tbe attitude and policy ot France could 
be cbanged. 
J.S. Bu •• tt, .Prot ••• or 01 American Hlatory, wrote. 
The student of United State. history •• 11 knows 
bow d.eply strike tbe roots of popular r •• ent-
ment when the penalties of war are enforced by 
persistent .interterence with the eivil lire ot 
the vanquished. The i'ss •• bly of the League of 
Nations bad not read our history de.llly on that 
point, or it they had read it, they did not dar. 
apply its l •• sona. Aa it I1J"oved, europe had to 
cliab up tbe hill ot r •• !Htaent and the. down 
again on the otber slde. 3 
The i.portance of GenftaQJ's place amon, the nations ot 
the world can not be over.stl.ated. Ind •• d, this is true ot 
every natioD, but p&rticul<1:lrly those in which feelings ot 
nationalism are waxing. Whether one considers this a force for 
lood or ill is of no cODse<luence. What .at tors 18 that 1 t is 
l!!JobD Spencer 8assett. llli Le~ue of ~a~D8! a · 
.t,,. in .. otld pol&11os. (Xew Yo .. : Dp_.e. Eo., 
I " p. 104. 
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an undeniably powertul impelling factor in the behavior of 
states both large and small. Of no one was this more true •• an 
G.raanr. She W88 not alone in conceiving that she po ••••••• a 
rightful •• at in the iniernaiional body of the League. The 
business ot Europe and the world ought not be conducted without 
Germany's coun.el. It .eant more than prestige; it meant the 
power to share in shaping the events of the world to which the 
League would bear witness. Perhaps most revealing of all re-
garding this point was the lansuage of the plebiscite taken in 
1933 to determine the citizens' position OR German membership 
in the League, 
Th. German gov.rnment and the German people are 
iherelore at one in the decision to withdraw 
from the Disarmament Conference and the League 
until this real eQuality is no longer withheld 
from our people.~~6 
More than ninety per cent of the voters went to the polls and 
voted ·ye •• • It must be readily granted that the case i. not 
made that recognition as an equal was the ruling tactor in this 
tateful decision. There wa., by tbis time, no doubt anywhere 
that Germany was in the process ot re-arming herself and had 
no intention ot relinquishing a single bullet. But that does 
not detract from tbe basic desire tor acceptance. As tor 
armaments, that is one way to toree respect froa one. neighbors. 
lSiMildred s. Wertheimer. "The Foreign Policy ot the 
Third Reich," Foreign Policy Reports. X, No.2 (28 March 1934) 
p. 15. Aa qnotea Iro. volflscher Biobacbter, 12 November 1933. 
!i 
! 
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The continuing fear of Germany on the part of France 
coupled with the General tear of a Russian war led her to main-
tain a large army. This she could ill afford. It contributed 
to a state ot apprehension and uncertainty which blocked the 
establishment of tbe harmony and confidence in Europe so nec-
essary to the progress of the League. France's excessive concern 
tor tbe war reparations exacted upon Germany made it see. as 
thougb ber entire policy in the League was bent in that direc-
tion. The close association witb France with the other leading 
.e.bers of that body could only reinforce the German notioD 
tbat it was constituted for DO purpose other than binding ber 
in economic servitude. 
Tbat tbe reparations were unwise and unrealistic was 
demonstrated by their cataclysmic ettect upon the German aation, 
and so upon tbe whole ot Europe. Freneb policy in the Saar 
and Ruhrretleeted this and only made the situation worse. The 
state of aftairs were critical. But against this background 
serious efforts were being made to bring about stability in all 
areas. 
The First Asse.bly of the League appointed the Tem-
porary Mixed Commission to report a plan of disara .. ent. Out 
of this evolved the Draft Treaty ot Mutual Guarantee ot 1922 
which in turn gave rise to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assis-
tance of 1923. Though Dei~ber of these was adopted, they 
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served the purpose of clarifying ideas and providing a concrete 
form for debate in the Assembly. They were the stepping stones 
tor the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Treaty and Conventions. 
The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settle.ent of International 
Disputes, though it too tailed of adoption, exerted a powertul 
influence on the League, and ultimately the Pact of Locarno, 
This last established the sorely needed political stability 
in Europe so essential to German entranoe into the League. 
Progress in this direction was aided by a liberalization 
ot the foreign policies of France and England, This came about 
through political change in both these countries. In 1924 the 
Labor party with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister took con-
trol of the British Parliaaent. That same year, some tew 
months later, Edouard Harriot, the Socialist leader ot a 
Liberal coalition, came to power in France. Tocether they 
marshalled support tor the Dawes Commission, a plan for re-
solving the reparations question and alleviating the onus of 
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, the war-guilt clause.157 
It remained tor Dr. Gustav Stresemann to tinish the complicated 
task ot bringing Germany into the League. 
The political situation in Germany was complex and 
volatile. The lett wing Socialists and Radicals held a liberal 
position regarding toreign attairs. and stood internally for 
. IS'George Glasgow, From Dawes to Locarno. New York, 
Harper's, 1926. 
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the nationalization of some industry_ They were the staunchest 
supporters ot the Republic. Opposite them stood the right 
wing Nationalists who favored the restoration of the monarchy 
and were conservatives domestically. Between these extremes 
were the pivotal parties of the Center. They stood for the 
Republic and so placed it on firm ground. They were conser-
vative domestically and so kept the nation from socialism. Most 
important tor the League effort ot Stresemann, their foreign 
policy attitude was liberal. The Lett had its necessary 
majority and strese.ann his support trom the Reichstag. His 
mandate, however. was tar trom solid. His policies were de-
nounced tro. all sides depending upon the issue. The skill 
with which he played one taction against the other was nothing 
it not superb.1S8 
So precarious was the political position of the govern-
ment that the acceptance of the Locarno Treaty brought about 
Its downfall. A new government was formed and set about pre-
paring Germany's application for adminission into the League 
of Nations. The Nationalist party continued to object, but 
their major points or contention were met by the French and 
the strength of their position dissolved. On the eighth of 
February 1926, the Cabinet unanimously accepted str •• emann's 
158Ferdinand Fridensburg. Die WeiMarer ReRubl1k. 
Berlin, 1946. 
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draft of the note which was to be sent to the League applying 
for admission. 
Unfortunately, great difficulties were yet to be over-
come before Germany could be accepted for membership. The 
problems bow lay on the other side. The Covenant obliged mem-
bers to provide militarily for the Comllon defence against 
enemies. Germany had no army to speak of and thus could not 
comply with this requirement. But this disability could be and 
was overcome. 159 Of greater moment was the dispute regarding 
the permanent seats in the Council. Spain, out of pride, co-
veted a permanent seat in the Council and Brazil, as the 
~arge.t state in America, thought she deserved one. FinallYt 
Poland, with the support of France, announced her demand for a 
permanent seat. 
It was then disclosed that Great Britain stood in sup-
port of Spain's bid. That such intrigue should infest the 
League of Nations was an appalling shock to the world which had 
so recently been infused with the spirit of Locarno. The ten-
member Council, as it was established, and as it actually 
operated, consisted ot four permanent members with three of 
the non-permanent members, Spain, Belgina and Brazil, having 
had what amounted to permanent place. tro. the beginning. Such 
was the position of the interested nations that ~~nly a vi tal 
IS'Walterst oe. cit., Vol. I., p. 281. 
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change in the structure of the Council could resolve the im-
passe. This entailed a considerable amount of political maneu-
vering which appeared at times like a game of musical cbairs 
except that it was in earnest and the peace of the world was 
at stake. The way was made clear for Germany to enter the 
League and as sum. one of five permanent seats on a Council 
now expanded to fourteen a.mbers, niDe of whom would be 
selected on a rotating basis. But in accomplishing this, the 
League lost two members, Spain and Brazil, both of which states 
withdrew Irom the League in accordance with Article I of the 
Covenant. It was not the happiest possible solution.160 
On the eight of September 1926, the seventh Assembly 
passed by a unanimous vote Germany's application tor m.mber-
ship in the League of Nations. Two days later it came time for 
the Assembly to admit the German delegates. Their credentials 
were reported 1n order and Strese.ann, with two associaies, 
made his entry to applause. He made a speech pledging the 
loyalty of Germany, 
It cannot be the purpose of the Divine world 
order that men should direct their supreme 
national energies against one another, thus ever 
thrusting back the general progress of civi11za-
tion ••• the cooperation of the peoples in the 
League of Nations must and will lead to just 
solutions for the moral questions which arise in 
tbe conscience of the peoples. The most durable 
160 Bassett, 0e. cit., p. 326. 
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foundation of peace is a policy inspired bY161 
mutual respect between nation and nations. 
On this occasion the French representative, Briand, gave his 
most hopeful address before the Assembly: 
Peace for Germany and for France, that means 
that we have done with the long series of terri-
ble and sanguinary conflicts which have stained 
the pages of history. We have done with the 
black veils of mourning for sufferings that can 
never be appeased, done with war, done with 
brutal and sanguinary methods of settling our 
disputes_ True, differences between us still 
exist, but henceforth it will be for the judge 
to declare the law. Just as individual citizens 
take their difficulties to be settled by a mag-
istrate, so shall we bring ours to be settled 
by pacific procedure. Away with rifles, machine-
guns, cannon I Clear the way for conciliation, 
arbitration, peace. 162 
Yet at this very lIollent, stresemann and his colleagues were 
aware of what troubled times lay ahead. The Germany for whicb 
he spoke was that same one to whom the cult of the sword had 
for centuries been a religion. It still comprised the ir-
reconciliable Nationalists, and the irrepressible militarists 
who lived only to the tunes of national glory. Where those 
discordant notes would lead could only be guessed at. The 
truth would reveal itself all too 800n. 163 
On October 23, 1933. Germany announced her withdrawal 
froll the League of Nations, and on March 16, 1935. tormally 
i6IllWl 
• t 
p. 329. 
l62lbid., p. 329. 
l63Kohn , OPT cit-, pp. 290-297. 
denounced the clauses or the Treaty of Versailles concerning 
her disarmament. The circle was complete. 
, • CONCWSION 
At the very least. an international organization should 
provide a torue for ongoing dialogue between nations. This is 
most true among states wbich are experiencing difficultie. in 
their relationships. It is precisely tbey who need sucb a 
conference table. Friendly nations which bave similar institu-
tions and aspirations find tbemselves with multiple channels 
of coamunication. Governments generally have been reluctant 
to do barm to tbeir neighbors in the midst of formalized dis-
cussion with them. When that is the intent, the first action 
taken is to leave the table. In the minds of many, this ought 
not to be allowed. The weight of public opinion grows ever 
heavier, and one day will not be overborne. 
wrote: 
Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical "Pace. in Terris" 
••• a11 human beings, as they take an ever more 
active part in the public life of their own 
political communities, are showing an increas-
ing interest in the affairs of all pe()jlles t and 
are becoming more consciously aware that they 
are liviYi4members of a universal family of 
mankinG. 
164 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, Part IV, p. 145. 
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No supranational authority can rightfully be the instrument of 
one-sided interests • 
••• the present system of organization and the 
way its principle of authority operated on a 
world basis no longer correspond to the objQi:tive 
requirements of the universal coamon good. 165 
This must apply as well to the League and the United 
Nations. Such is tbe interdependence of every nation in the 
world that no single nation or concert of states can alford 
to isolate itself from the world or impose isolation on any 
otber state ao matter how inimical may be its political in-
stitutions. 
165Ibi<!e, Part IV, p. 135. 
APPENDIXES 
Appendix A - Membership 1n League of Nations-Covenanta 
Artiele 1t parSfra&h i: Tbe original Member. of the League of 
Nailons s att e t ose of tbe Signatories which are named in 
the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other states 
named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this 
Covenant. Such accession shall be affected by a Declaration 
deposited into force of the Covenant, Notice thereof shall be 
sent to all other Members of the League. 
Article 1. P~flrapb 2: Any fully self-governing state, 
DOmInIon or 0 ony not named in the Annex may become a Member 
of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of 
the Assembly, provided that it sball give effective guarantees 
of its intellectual obligations, and shall aceept such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its 
military, naval and air foree. and armaaents. 
Dee. 1920 - 5th Committee of Ass •• bly charged with problem of 
adaission appointed 3 subco .. ittees, 7 members each and pre-
pared the following questions in respect of each applicant 
wbich the Sub-eommittees were charged to investigate: 
a) Was the (applicant's) application for admissions to the 
League in order? 
b) Was the Government applying for admission recognized de jure 
or de facto and by which states? 
c) Was the applicant a nation with a stable government and 
settled frontiers? What .ere its size and its population? 
d) .fas it fully self-governing? 
e) What had been its conduct, including both aets and assurance 
with regard to (1) its international obligations; (11) the 
prescriptions of the League as to covenants? 
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Appendix C - Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16: 
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard 
of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, 15, it shall ispo 
facto be deemed to have committed any act of war against 
all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake 
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade 
or tinancial relations, the prohibition ot all intercourse 
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-
breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, com-
mercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of 
the covenant-whether a Me.ber of tbe League or not. 
2. It shall be the duty of tbe Council in such case to re-
commend to the several Governments concerned wbat effective 
military, naval or air torce the Me.bers of the League shall 
severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to pro-
tect the covenants of tbe League. 
3. Tbe Members of the League agree, further, that they will 
mutually support one another in the financial and economic 
measure whicb are taken under tbis Article, in order to 
.inimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the 
above measures, and that they will mutually support one 
mlother in resisting any special measures aimed at one of 
their nnaber by the covenant-breaking State, and that they 
will take the necessary steps to afford passage through 
their territory to the forees of any of the Members ot the 
League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of 
the League. 
4. Any Member ot the League which has violated any covenant of 
tbe League may be declared to be no longer a Me.ber of the 
League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Repre-
sentatives of all the other Members of the League repre-
sented thereon. 
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